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Abstract
This paper examines the substitutability and complementarity of a variety of risk
management strategies that firms can use to reduce price risk exposure.  Time-series analysis over
a period of significant regulatory changes indicates that natural gas companies increased
diversification and started using derivatives as price risk increased following price deregulation and
the regulated unbundling of sale and transmission activities.  The use of derivatives is a substitute
both for holding internal cash and for storing gas underground.  The latter two activities are
complements.  In choosing between derivatives and storage or cash holdings, less profitable and
more financially distressed firms are more likely to manage risk using derivatives.  Accounting
earnings management strategies, however, are not complements to activities that have a "real"
effect on cash flow volatility and diversification is not related to financial hedging activities.
Market-based estimates of wellhead gas price sensitivities are negative prior to deregulation and
become significantly positive following price deregulation.  The change in exposure is consistent
with the changing role of pipelines from buyers of gas for transport to only transporters of gas
resulting from deregulation.  Cross-sectional variation in price sensitivities is related to firms' use
of combinations of operational (non-accounting) and financial hedging activities.  Firms that
pursue these activities have smaller and less variable risk-adjusted wellhead gas return exposures
than firms that do not, especially post-deregulation.3
Choices Among Alternative Risk Management Strategies:
Evidence from the Natural Gas Industry
This paper examines firms’ choices among various risk management strategies that can be
used to reduce price risk exposure.  Unlike most recent empirical research on risk management that
focuses primarily on derivatives use as a risk management tool (exceptions are Tufano, 1996 and
Petersen and Thiagarajan, 1999), the tests in this paper examine a wide variety of activities that
contribute to a firm’s overall exposure to price risk.  In particular, in addition to financial risks this
analysis considers non-financial risk management strategies, including accounting earnings
management, diversification, physical storage, and operational hedging.  Since part of the sample
period is prior to the development of an active spot market and exchange-traded derivatives market
for natural gas futures and options, we consider risk management activities in the absence of
alternatives for financial hedging.  This feature of the sample period makes the results more
generalizable to industries where financial risks (e.g., price risks) that are more typically managed
with financial products are a relatively small component of the total risks that the firms are
managing.
The paper focuses on the natural gas industry to take advantage of a unique series of
regulatory events that changed pipelines’ price risk exposures.  Beginning in 1978, regulators took
a number of steps to deregulate various aspects of the natural gas industry including natural gas
prices.  As a result, natural gas pipelines became increasingly exposed to gas price risk.  These
regulatory events provide a powerful setting to examine changes in risk-related activities unlike
cross-sectional tests of the determinants of risk management based on levels of firm characteristics
and proxies for the levels of risk management (e.g., Géczy, Minton, and Schrand, 1997; Tufano,
1996; Mian, 1996; and Dolde, 1993).
1
During the early part of the sample period prior to price deregulation, natural gas pipeline
companies used over-the-counter long-term contracts containing "take-or-pay" and “minimum-bill”
contracts to manage exposure to price changes.  As deregulation adversely affected the risk
exposures of pipelines in the early 1980s, the sample pipelines increased diversification.  This4
trend toward diversification is opposite the trend away from diversification that was occurring
during this time period for U.S. firms in general.  Pipelines achieved diversification both by
making acquisitions outside the natural gas industry and by divesting of subsidiaries engaged in
natural gas related businesses.  Finally, the pipeline firms turned to exchange-traded natural gas
derivative products in the early 1990s as they became available.  At fiscal year-end 1991, only five
firms disclose using energy-based derivatives.  However, by 1995, all but two firms report using
energy-based derivatives to manage commodity price risk.
Univariate and factor analysis of the relations among risk-related activities over the sample
period indicate that the use of financial derivatives as a risk management tool is a substitute for two
alternative activities related to price risk exposure: holding a buffer of internal cash and storing gas
underground.  Moreover, these latter two activities are complements to each other.  Consistent with
the evidence that storing gas and holding cash are complementary activities, the firms that pursue
these "hedging" activities are similar to each other and significantly different from the "non-
hedgers" in these categories.  In particular, the cash "hedgers" and the storage "hedgers" are more
profitable and less financially distressed than the non-hedgers.  In contrast, the firms that
extensively use derivatives to manage price risk are less profitable and more financially distressed.
Finally, accounting earnings management strategies are not complements to activities that have a
"real" effect on cash flow volatility and diversification is not related to financial hedging activities.
Over the entire sample period, the stock returns of the sample pipelines are significantly
sensitive to natural gas price changes.  Risk adjusted market-based estimates of wellhead gas price
sensitivities are negative in the first several years of the sample period and become significantly
positive for the pipelines following price deregulation, particularly after the Decontrol Act of 1989
when natural gas futures became the most volatile exchange-traded futures contract from 1992 to
1994 (Fitzgerald and Pokalsky, 1995).  The negative natural gas price betas prior to deregulation
reflect the role of the pipeline as a consumer of gas, when the pipelines purchased significant
quantities of gas for transportation and resale.  The positive betas post-deregulation are consistent
with the unbundling of the sale and transportation of gas.  The pipeline's post-deregulation
                                                                                                                                                            
1 Guay (1999) exploits a setting of changing exposures by examining first-time derivatives users.5
exposure is similar to that of a producer, rather than a consumer, in that the value of the firm's
services rises and falls with the demand for gas.
The stock price sensitivities vary cross-sectionally as function of the use of hedging
techniques and activities predicted to be associated with natural gas price risk.  Firms that use
derivatives have smaller and less variable stock price sensitivities to natural gas returns than do
natural gas firms in general.  In addition, users of non-derivative hedging activities such as holding
cash buffers or storing gas also have smaller and less variable sensitivities to natural gas price
fluctuations than the entire sample of natural gas firms at large.
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section II describes the sample.  Section III summarizes
regulatory changes in the natural gas industry from 1978 to 1995 and shows the corresponding
time-series pattern of price risk during this period.  In Section IV, we discuss various activities of
pipeline firms that affect their exposure to price risk and review the time-series changes in these
activities.  In addition, we examine whether these activities are used as substitutes or complements
and the firm characteristics that are associated with cross-sectional variation in the use of these
activities.  Finally, in Section V we analyze how different risk-related activities are associated with
market-based measures of price risk exposure.  Section VI concludes.
II. Sample
The sample represents publicly traded natural gas companies that are major interstate natural
gas pipelines or that have subsidiaries that are major interstate natural gas pipelines during the
period 1978 to 1995.  We identify major pipelines using Form 2 filings, “Annual Report of Natural
Gas Companies” to the Energy Information Agency.  These filings, which are required by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC, the industry regulatory agency), provide
comprehensive data on pipelines’ annual financial and operating conditions.
2  In almost all years,
                                                
2 The reports contain financial and operating information for both Class A (Major) and Class B (Minor) interstate
pipeline companies in the United States.  Major interstate natural gas pipeline companies are defined as “those firms
that have combined gas sales for resale and gas transported (interstate) or stored for a fee that exceeded 50 billion
cubic feet during the preceding calendar year or those firms that filed FERC Form 11, Natural Gas Pipeline
Company Monthly Statement.  Class A (B) pipeline companies have annual gas revenues of at least $2.5 million (at
least one million dollars but less than $2.5 million).  These dollar figures are not deflated over time.  Form 2 filings
are included in annual volumes of Statistics of Interstate Natural Gas Companies.6
these major interstate pipelines account for over 80 percent of the total gas receipts, total assets,
total sales, and gas operating revenues in the industry.  Thus, the sample is very comprehensive of
the natural gas transmission market.  Table I lists the pipelines with available FERC data that are in
the final sample and the minimum and maximum number of pipelines owned by each firm during
its tenure in the sample.
While a few pipelines are publicly-traded entities, almost all pipelines that were identified in
FERC Form 2 filings are subsidiaries of natural gas companies or holding companies that also own
other energy subsidiaries or transportation subsidiaries (i.e., railroad and trucking operations).
Subsidiary pipelines are matched to publicly-traded entities on the CRSP (Center for Research in
Security Prices) database based on reviews of annual reports of natural gas companies, selected
discussions in the annual Statistics of Interstate Natural Gas Companies, and LEXIS/NEXIS
searches.  Joint ownership of some pipelines complicates the process of combining the FERC data
(which is reported at the pipeline level) with Compustat or CRSP data (which is reported for the
entity that owns the pipeline).  For jointly owned pipelines, the pipeline data are divided among the
sample firms that own the pipeline according to the entities' ownership percentages.  Thus, a
sample firm’s natural gas data are the weighted average of the data for each FERC pipeline that it
owns.
3  Over 95% of the major interstate pipelines are matched with one or more publicly-traded
firms.  After restricting the sample to firms with available data on Compustat, the final annual
samples contain a minimum of 21 firms (1978) and a maximum of 25 firms (1985).
[INSERT TABLE I HERE.]
As expected, various measures of accounting earnings changes for the sample firms are
significantly correlated with changes in natural gas prices during the sample period.  For each firm
i, we estimate the following time-series regression for each of eight proxies for accounting
                                                
3 Note that the sum of the natural gas data across pipelines does not necessarily equal the segment data reported by
firms in their annual reports or on Compustat.  The aggregated annual report/Compustat data include other pipelines
which are not classified as major interstate pipelines, gas segments other than transmission, and sometimes oil
segments.7
earnings changes (referred to collectively as ACCTGNUM) on natural gas price changes using
annual data from 1978 to 1995:
DACCTG NUMi =  a0   +  a1(WHi,t - WHi,t -1) WHi,t -1 +ei (1)
where WH is the wellhead natural gas price, which is the price that pipelines pay to producers to
purchase gas.  The wellhead price was regulated at the beginning of the sample period and
deregulated during the sample period.  The wellhead price for year t is the average of the twelve
month-end prices for the year obtained from The Monthly Energy Review.
Table II reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of the coefficient
estimates from the firm-specific regressions.  The table also reports the number of regressions
estimated and the number of coefficient estimates that are significant at better than the 10%
significance level.  Regressions are estimated for all firms with at least seven annual observations.
[INSERT TABLE II HERE.]
Annual percentage changes in total sales revenues for the parent company are statistically
and positively related to annual percentage changes in natural gas prices for 14 of the 25 sample
firms.  Changes in natural gas transmission and distribution segment revenues as reported on
FERC Form 2 filings (Compustat) are statistically positively related to changes in wellhead prices
for eleven (four) of 22 (21) firms.  These segment revenues are related only to the transmission
and distribution of gas in contrast to total sales revenues that include revenues related to natural gas
exploration and production.  The smaller number of statistically significant coefficient estimates
potentially reflects the regulation of transmission prices to various degrees during the sample
period.  The quantities and prices that generate the segment revenues are not necessarily the current
spot price or current quantities of gas because of prices and quantities established in long-term8
contracts with take-or-pay or minimum bill clauses.  The nature of these agreements and their
impact on price risk is discussed further in Section III.
4
Changes in the proxies for net earnings (total firm operating income, total firm net income,
operating income reported on Form 2, and net income reported on Form 2) are only statistically
related to changes in wellhead prices for a small number of the sample firms.  One explanation for
the lack of sensitivity of net income to natural gas prices, despite the sensitivity of revenues, is that
earnings contain income and costs that are unrelated to gas activities including restructuring
charges, litigation settlements, and non-operating income or expenses.  With respect to operating
income, however, the lack of sensitivity provides a preliminary indication that the sample firms are
undertaking risk management activities that match gas-price sensitive costs to gas-price sensitive
revenues.
These regressions show that the sample firms are exposed to changes in gas prices over the
entire sample period, but the estimations do not attempt to document changes in exposure. It is
difficult to document changes in accounting-based natural gas price sensitivities through time
because of the small sample of firms and the limited frequency of accounting observations during
the period.  We use higher frequency stock return data in Section III to illustrate changes in
exposure.
III. The effects of regulation
Section A summarizes the operations and regulation of the natural gas industry that are
salient to this study by focusing on regulation that affected the risks faced by pipelines.  This
limited discussion of the effects of regulation on the industry is based on more extensive analyses
from the following sources: American Gas Association (1987), Castaneda and Smith (1996),
Fitzgerald and Pokalsky (1995), and the New York Mercantile Exchange (undated).  Section B
illustrates the corresponding effects of the changes in regulation on changes in characteristics of the
sample firms and their stock-price sensitivity to gas returns.
                                                
4 We also use annual percentage changes in the quantities of total natural gas sales and deliveries as a dependent
variable in equation (1) (results not reported).  None of the natural gas price coefficient estimates is statistically
different from zero.  This result is not surprising during the period 1978-1995.  Both regulation and underground
storage of natural gas combine to disrupt the normal price-quantity relation observed in a competitive market.9
We recognize that regulation is endogenous and do not claim that the observed changes in
risk management practices and gas price sensitivities were necessarily a response to the regulatory
changes.  The observed changes also potentially represent a response to the same factors that
inspired the regulation.  Moreover, the effects of regulation do not typically occur on the date that
the regulation is enacted.  Clearly, firms can anticipate the potential regulation prior to its enactment
and can react to its potential effects.  The complex relations among regulation, firms' reactions to
regulation, and the underlying factors that affect both are considered in the following analysis.
A. Overview of regulation
Two central features of the natural gas industry between the mid-1950s and late 1970s were
regulated pricing and the bundling of the sale and transportation of gas.  Pipeline companies
purchased gas from producers at regulated wellhead prices.  Pipelines transported purchased gas
(and their own production) to the “city gate” for resale to local distribution companies (such as gas
utilities) and other end users at regulated city-gate prices.  The spread between the city-gate price
and the wellhead price covered the pipeline’s cost of transportation.  Throughout this period, a
formal spot market or futures market for the purchase of natural gas did not exist.
From the mid-1930s through 1978, pipeline companies commonly entered into long-term
contracting arrangements to purchase gas from producers (take-or-pay contracts) and to sell gas to
end users (contracts containing minimum bill provisions) to guard against gas shortages and
mitigate price risk (Masten and Crocker, 1985).  A take-or-pay contract required that the pipeline
pay for a minimum quantity of gas during the contract period at a preset regulated wellhead price
(plus tariffs and other transaction fees).  The producer and pipeline negotiated the quantity.  A
minimum bill provision similarly required that the end user pay the pipeline for a minimum quantity
of gas during the contract period at the regulated city-gate price.  Under both contracts, the gas-
receiving party did not have to take delivery of all purchased gas.  Because the pipelines had the10
opportunity to use both types of long-term contracts, price risk associated with take-or-pay
contracts existed only if the firm did not have offsetting contracts with minimum bill provisions.
5
The first major regulatory change that increased natural gas price risk for pipelines occurred
in the late 1970s following the enactment of the Energy Reorganization Act in 1977.  This act
abolished the Federal Power Commission (FPC) and established the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC).  The regulations that followed were designed to increase the flow of gas into
the interstate market and deregulate wellhead natural gas prices.  In particular, the Natural Gas
Policy Act (NGPA) of 1978 removed controls over market entry and wellhead gas sales and
established partial deregulation of prices.
6  Briefly, the NGPA established "categories" of gas
based on age.  The prices of the various categories were deregulated in stages over time.  The act,
first discussed in April 1977, also discussed the establishment of a spot market for gas and allowed
end users, including local distribution companies, to buy gas directly from producers and contract
for transportation services separately with the pipelines (Section 311).  Subsequent to the NGPA,
the newly established FERC issued additional orders meant as gradual steps toward the ultimate
goal of deregulation of the wellhead price of natural gas.  For the pipeline companies, price risk
was generally increasing with each new FERC order.
FERC Order 380 (1984, first discussed in late 1983) was the first to have a significant
impact on price risk.  At the time of the order, the deregulated wellhead prices were decreasing
because of an increased supply of natural gas in the early 1980s, attributed to energy conservation
and the end of the OPEC embargo.  However, city-gate prices remained regulated at levels above
wellhead prices.  For example, at the end of December 1983 the city-gate price was $1.30 per mcf
greater than the wellhead price of $2.58.  The lower demand for natural gas triggered minimum
bill clauses in contracts between end users and pipelines which was costly to end users
(Henderson, Guldmann, Hemphill, and Lee, 1986).  FERC responded to this situation by issuing
Order 380.  This order freed pipeline customers from their obligations under minimum bill
provisions with the pipelines.  However, the pipelines were not freed from their take-or-pay
                                                
5 See Parsons (1989) for a discussion of the effects of take-or-pay provisions in contracts and a method for pricing
their option value.11
obligations with producers.
7  The result was huge losses for the pipeline companies that led to
significant industry-wide financial distress (Castaneda and Smith, 1996).  As a result of this order,
the hedge that the firms thought they had created by matching these two types of long-term
contracts was disrupted by the regulators, and the firms faced an increase in price risk.  Given
prices at this time, the increased price risk meant increased payments by the pipelines.
In the following year, FERC Order 436 (October 1985, first discussed in December 1984)
made three significant changes that increased the exposure of pipelines to natural gas prices.  First,
it required pipelines that     elected        to transport gas under the order to provide open access
transportation services.  This requirement was the first major step in the unbundling of the sale and
transportation of natural gas such that end users could buy gas directly from gas merchants at the
wellhead and transport the gas via the pipelines.  Second, Order 436 required pipelines to allow
customers to convert their firm purchase obligations to firm transportation services over a five-year
period.  Third, Order 436 instituted some controls over city-gate prices.
8  FERC Order 500
(1987), which replaced Order 436 in 1987, reduced the pipelines' costs associated with take-or-
pay contracts.  Order 500 allowed gas quantities sold directly by a producer to an end-user but
transported through the pipeline to count towards the pipeline's take-or-pay obligation with the
producer (Williams and Parent, 1988).  This provision mitigated the increase in price risk and
related financial burden that occurred when FERC freed end-users from their obligations under
minimum bill provisions without freeing the pipelines from their take-or-pay obligations.
FERC Order 451 (1986) further provided for the sharing of costs related to take-or-pay
contracts between producers and pipelines that had begun with FERC Orders 436/500.  It required
that producers and pipelines enter into "good faith" renegotiations of existing take-or-pay contracts.
The order also brought vintage gas prices (one of the many categories of gas classified under
                                                                                                                                                            
6 Descriptions of natural gas regulation during this time period do not discuss quantity controls or quantity rationing.
The focus of regulation during this time period was price regulation.
7 Following the NGPA of 1978, pipelines and producers entered into special marketing programs (SMPs) in which
the producer sold gas to the end user at a discounted price and specified which pipeline would transport the gas.  This
arrangement provided some take-or-pay relief for the pipelines because gas transmitted under the SMPs was counted
towards the take-or-pay obligation.  The courts terminated SMPs in 1985 claiming that they were discriminatory
against LDCs because they were offered only to industrial end users.
8 Specifically, Order 436 required pipelines to set maximum rates designed to ration capacity during peak periods and
maximize the flow of gas (throughput) for firm services during off peak periods and for interruptible services during
all periods.12
NGPA) to market levels thus continuing the deregulation of wellhead natural prices that had started
with the NGPA of 1978.  FERC Order 500 affected pipelines' risks differently as a function of
their inventory of gas and the extent of their take-or-pay contracts with producers.
Finally, FERC Order 636 (1992, first discussed in early 1991), which completed the series
of FERC mandates, resulted in a reorganization of the natural gas industry.
9  Order 636 mandated
that     all       pipelines unbundle the sale and transportation of natural gas (unlike Order 436 which
allowed the pipeline firms to elect open-access).  It also required that pipelines provide for the
issuance of blanket “sales for resale” certificates for gas sales at market-based prices and
nondiscriminatory open-access transportation and storage services.
10  The implementation of
FERC Order No. 636 was completed by the end of 1994.
B. Time-series illustrations of the effects of regulation
Table III reports yearly averages for selected financial characteristics for the sample natural
gas firms for 1979, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1992, and 1995.  These periods represent the first-year
after the start of deregulation (1979), four years in which major regulatory events occurred, and the
end of the sample period.  Figure 1 graphs the monthly wellhead price of natural gas over the entire
sample period and marks the dates of significant regulatory events.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE.]
Panel A of Table III shows a steady increase in the numbers of sample firms during the
period of price deregulation.  In 1979, the sample contains 22 natural gas companies that own 33
major interstate natural gas pipelines.  The number of firms increases to a maximum of 25 in 1985
(not reported) and declines to 21 in 1995.  The number of pipelines and total pipeline transmission
                                                
9 Prior to Order 636, Congress enacted the Decontrol Act (1989) that amended the NGPA of 1978.  The 1989 act
eliminated the remaining price controls on some of the aging categories of natural gas sold at the wellhead.
10 In addition to the components of Order 636 that directly and significantly affected price risk, Order 636 also made
some significant changes to operating activities in the industry that have no direct impact on price risk.  For
example, Order 636 required that pipelines adopt a generic capacity release program, changed transportation rate
design methodology from modified fixed-variable to a straight fixed-variable (SFV) rate design, and established
policies for the recovery of all transition costs for implementing Order 636 (http://www.ferc.fed.us).13
miles follow similar increasing trends.  The initial increases in the numbers of sample firms,
pipelines, and transmission miles correspond to entry following increases in natural gas prices
associated with the NGPA in 1978.
[INSERT TABLE III HERE.]
After 1984, the number of pipelines and firms decline.  The decreases result both from
mergers and acquisitions within the industry as well as from exit from the industry due, in part, to
bankruptcies.  By 1984, natural gas prices were at an all time high.  Table III, Panel B, reports that
prices ranged from $0.91 per mcf in 1979 to $2.57 in 1984 and $1.84 at the end of the sample
period.  Also in 1984, take-or-pay contracts between pipelines and producers were being triggered
while FERC Order 380 was allowing end users and local distribution companies to renege on
minimum bill provisions with the pipelines.  Together, these events resulted in financial losses for
the pipelines.
Table III also reports the time-series patterns in selected gas account statistics for FERC
Form 2 pipelines (see Panel C) over the years of changes in regulation described in the previous
section.  The ratio of gas purchased to total gas receipts declines from 60.99% in 1979 to only
6.60% in 1995.  The unbundling of transportation and merchant functions forced firms to transport
more gas purchased by others and transport a smaller percentage of gas purchased by the pipeline
for resale.  Total gas sales declined from 59.99% of total sales and deliveries in 1979 to 28.55% in
1987 and then to only 7.92% in 1995.  During the same period, gas deliveries increased from
40.01% of total sales and deliveries to 92.07%.
Customer composition also changed during the period of deregulation.  Gas sales for resale
declined almost monotonically from 56.25% of total sales and deliveries in 1979 to 3.00% in
1995.  In contrast, gas received from others for transportation increased from 18.21% of total gas
receipts to 82.62% during the period from 1979 to 1995.  Given the regulatory changes taking
place during the sample period, gas transported for others was most likely purchased in the spot
market (Fitzgerald and Pokalsky, 1995).14
Table III (Panel D) also shows the time-series trends in some key financial indicators for
the pipeline parent companies.  The profit margins of the sample firms, as measured by the ratio of
operating income to total sales, increased from about 16% to over 20% during the sample period.
11
However, the ratio of net income to sales did not change significantly during the sample period.
After eliminating one firm with extreme ratios of net income to sales in years 1993 through 1995
and another firm with an extreme ratio in 1995, the ratio of net income to sales is approximately
0.04 from 1987 through 1992 and then increases to over 0.06 for the remainder of the sample
period.
 12  The increases from 1990 to 1992 or 1995 are not significant.  One explanation for the
increase in operating profit margins without a corresponding increase in net profit margins is the
increase in special items (such as litigation and restructuring charges), extraordinary items, and
discontinued items that affect net income but not operating income.  In particular, total special
items, extraordinary items, and discontinued items as a percentage of sales are -0.001 in 1979
(primarily discontinued operations), -0.005 in 1984 (primarily special items), 0.000 in 1987, -
0.019 in 1990 (primarily special items), -0.015 in 1992 (special and extraordinary items), and
0.024 in 1995 (primarily discontinued operations).  Compared to the early years of the sample, the
amounts in the 1990s are a significant component of net profit margins.
Consistent with the claims of increasing financial distress in the industry following the
regulatory changes in 1984, Panel D shows that the sample firms were less able to service their
long-term obligations.  Average interest coverage ratios declined from 5.122 in 1979 to 3.899 in
1995.  However, during the same period firms’ market-to-book ratios increased from 2.440 in
1979 to 3.163 in 1995.  If the market-to-book ratio is a proxy for a firm's growth opportunities,
one interpretation of the increasing market-to-book ratios is that firms had higher growth
                                                
11 These figures are consistent with trends for the pipelines.  Pipeline profit margins, as measured by the ratio of
operating income to revenues using FERC Form 2 data, increased during the sample period from 14.7% to over 30%
in the 1990s.
12 The ratio of net income to sales for Leviathan partners is approximately 1.1 in 1993-1995.  Eighty-two percent of
Leviathan's net income in 1995 represents income from Leviathan's interest in pipeline partnerships.  Because the
partnerships are accounted for by the equity method, the partnership income is included in Leviathan's net income,
but the partnership revenues are not included in Leviathan's revenues.  The ratio of net income to sales for Williams
Cos. is 0.46 in 1995.  Williams Companies recorded a significant gain (77% of net income) related to the
discontinuation of network service operations.  Excluding these observations, the 1995 ratio of net income to sales
is 0.067.15
opportunities in 1995, post-deregulation, than in 1978.  As a benchmark, the average market-to-
book ratio (of equity) for all Compustat firms (excluding financial institutions) in 1995 was 2.589.
Changes in the sensitivities of stock returns to natural gas price returns also illustrate the
effects of regulation during the period from 1979 to 1995.  Natural gas price exposure is measured
using an extended market model that regresses returns for an equal-weighted portfolio of the
sample natural gas firms (RP) in excess of the rate of return on the 3-month Treasury Bills (RTB) on
the equal-weighted market return (RM) in excess of RTB and the excess return of average wellhead
prices (RNG – RTB).  The equal-weighted market return is used in place of the value-weighted
market return since the sample firms are quite small.  The results are qualitatively robust to the
choice of market measure.
RP - RTB =a+ bM RM -RTB ( )+ bNG RNG -RTB ( )+ e (2)
The model is estimated using monthly data and rolling 48-month windows from 1978 to
1995 (i.e., the first observation is estimated for the 48-month period ending December 31,
1981).
13  These regressions provide 169 estimates of natural gas price sensitivities using data from
the overlapping windows.  Motivated by the caveats in Tufano (1998) regarding potential problems
related to using monthly data, we use weekly spot price and market data to verify the robustness of
the beta estimates over the period since the early 1990s during which weekly data are available.
The natural gas betas using weekly data during this limited period are qualitatively similar to the
monthly results that we present.
[INSERT TABLE IV HERE.]
Table IV presents summary statistics for bNG  and bM for the full sample of natural gas
firms.  The mean estimate of bNG  is -0.05, and the time-series standard deviation of bNG  is 0.16,
                                                
13 60-month windows tend to span the time-periods during which the beta point estimates cross zero while 24 and
12-month windows tend to estimate betas with great imprecision.  The 48-month window offers a reasonable
compromise.  Results for the 48-month window are presented; results for the 36-month window are similar.16
with a maximum estimate of 0.21 and a minimum of -0.35.  Twenty-one percent of the estimated
wellhead-return betas are significantly different from zero.  In addition, the market betas are less
variable over time than the wellhead return sensitivities and 83% of the market betas are
significantly different from zero.  The average market beta is 0.65 with a standard deviation of
0.08 and a range from 0.42 to 0.88.  The use of overlapping observations likely understates the
true volatilities of the coefficient estimates (Hansen and Hodrick, 1980).  However, corrected t-
statistics confirm that bNG is significantly negatively on average.  The research on natural gas price
sensitivity, in particular, is limited but related papers on commodity price sensitivities provide
perspective on the statistics presented in Table IV.  The natural gas betas are similar to those
reported by Thorton and Welker (1999) and to oil price betas reported by Rajgopal and
Venkatachalam (1998).  Note, however, that both the mean oil and natural gas betas are
approximately half the average gold price beta reported by Tufano (1998).
The parameter values reported in Table IV demonstrate the volatility of natural gas price
sensitivities over the entire sample period, but the means hide the time-series patterns of changes in
wellhead price sensitivities.  Figure 2a illustrates the time-series of bNG  for the period following
establishment of the Natural Gas Policy Act (1978) to 1995 for the full sample of firms.  Each
plotted observation represents the bWH calculated using the preceding four years of data.  Thus,
the beta corresponds to the changes in regulation that occurred during the four years preceding the
stated beta date.  Between the time of the NGPA (1978) and the issuance of FERC Order 380
(1984) and continuing with Orders 436 and 500 (1985 and 1987, respectively), approximately half
of the sensitivities to changes in wellhead prices were negative, with an overall pattern of decrease.
Also during this first part of the sample period, the volatility of the bNG  estimates is higher than in
subsequent years.
As deregulation progressed in the 1980s and 1990s and wellhead price volatility increased,
the estimated gas sensitivities become positive around the effective date of the 1989 Decontrol Act,
which was first discussed in March 1989.  Following the initiation of NYMEX natural gas futures
contract trading in 1990, the average natural gas return sensitivity for the portfolio of sample firms17
is approximately 0.15 from 1993 through 1995.  In addition, the sensitivities are relatively less
volatile than in the periods prior to the initiation of these contracts.
Figure 2b presents the OLS t-statistics for the wellhead sensitivities and demonstrates that
the majority of statistically significant positive sensitivities occur after price deregulation,
particularly after the Decontrol Act of 1989 with values averaging approximately 2.0.  In contrast,
significantly negative natural gas exposures emerge in the first several years of the sample.  The
negative betas prior to deregulation reflect the role of the pipeline as a consumer of gas, when the
pipelines purchased significant quantities of gas for transportation and resale.  The positive betas
post-deregulation are consistent with the unbundling of the sale and transportation of gas.  The
pipelines’ exposures are similar to those of a producer, rather than a consumer, in that the value of
the firms’ services rise and fall with the demand for gas.  Market betas (not graphed) exhibit a
pattern similar to that of the bNG ’s with variable sensitivities in the first half of the sample period
and more stable estimates in the post-regulation period.
[INSERT FIGURE 2a and 2b HERE.]
Because the two-factor model above may not adequately explain stock returns in general,
we use an extended Fama-French (1993) five-factor model in addition to the extended market
model presented above:
RP - RTB =a+ bM(RM -RTB)+ bNG(RNG - RTB)
                     + bHMLRHML +bSMBRSMB + bTERMRTERM +bDEFRDEF +e (3)
This model includes a control for the potential impact of interest rates on the estimates of natural
gas price sensitivities.  The early part of the sample period coincides with a period of high and
volatile interest rates.  Three-month treasury bill rates exceeded 16% in August 1981 and interest
rate volatility was high following the change in monetary policy in 1979.  T-bill rates hit a low of
approximately 5.5% in late 1986 and remained at this level for a year before climbing again18
through 1988 and 1989.  Rates fell through early 1994 before a slight increase at the end of the
sample period.
The extended Fama-French model regresses the excess return of the entire sample portfolio
on six factors.  The factors are: (1) the value-weighted market return (RM) in excess of RTB; (2) the
excess return of average wellhead prices (RNG – RTB); (3) the return on a zero-investment portfolio
(RHML) which is constructed by subtracting the return on low book-to-market ratio firms from high
book-to-market firms (from Fama and French, 1993); (4) the return on a zero-investment portfolio
(RSMB) which is constructed by subtracting the return on a portfolio of large firms from the return
on small firms (from Fama and French, 1993); (5) the return difference between the 30-year
Treasury bond and the 3-month Treasury bill (RTERM); and (6) the return difference between BAA
corporate debt and AAA-rated corporate debt (RDEF).
14  Fama and French (1993) argue that RHML
captures the value and growth effects apparent in average returns, RSMB captures the size effect in
average returns, RTERM models the slope of the term structure, and RDEF models the corporate
“default spread.”  Market and Treasury bill returns are from CRSP.  Wellhead returns are
calculated using monthly wellhead prices as described previously.  RTERM and RDEF are constructed
using data from the Standard and Poor’s DRI macroeconomic database.
The second panel in Table IV reports summary statistics from rolling regressions similar to
those in the first panel.  The five-factor model regressions produce wellhead return betas that have
a mean value of –0.02 and volatility of 0.15, which is similar to the volatility of bNG  estimated
using the two-factor model.  The Hansen and Hodrick (1980) corrected t-statistics also show a
marginally significant and negative average natural gas beta estimate.  The minimum bNG  from the
five-factor model is lower than that from the extended market model (-0.35 vs. -0.44) while the
maximum is about the same (0.21 vs. 0.19).  Eighteen percent of the bNG  estimates are different
from zero at the 10% level.  The bNG  estimates that are reliably different from zero are negative at
the beginning of the sample period and positive near the end of the sample period.
Figures 3a and 3b show the time-series patterns of the bNG s estimated using the five-factor
model and the associated OLS t-statistics.  The patterns roughly match those for the estimates from
                                                
14 Gene Fama kindly provided the market, HML and SMB time series that we use in the regression.19
the two-factor model in Figures 2a and 2b.  In general, the bNG  estimates are negative in the first
part of the sample and increase in value as deregulation proceeds.  The increasing trend coincides
with the advent of FERC Orders 436 and 500 and the Decontrol Act and with the increase in
wellhead price volatility that accompanied deregulation.  The estimates remain positive and less
volatile even as wellhead price variability increased in the early to mid-1990s.  The parameter
estimates are relatively more stable in the last three years of the investigation period, 1993-1995.
15
By the end of the sample period, the bNG s shown in Figure 3a are significantly positive at the 10%
level, as illustrated in Figure 3b.
 [INSERT FIGURE 3a and 3b HERE.]
IV. Activities that affect natural gas price risk
This section describes financial and operational activities that affect the price exposure of
pipelines.  We analyze the time-series patterns in these activities, the associations among these
activities, and the firm characteristics associated with particular activity choices.  Cross-sectional
variation in these activities is potentially related to cross-sectional variation in the wellhead return
exposures of the pipelines’ stock returns.  The aggregated analysis in the previous section obscures
these potentially significant differences across firms, if any.  In Section V, we investigate the
association between the wellhead return sensitivities and the activities that can affect price risk.
This analysis shows the relative contribution of each activity to price risk exposure using a setting
that covers a period of significant increases in price risk due to deregulation.
We examine eight activities that can potentially affect a natural gas pipeline's price risk
exposure.  Extant empirical evidence on "hedging" generally focuses on the use of derivative
instruments or insurance products (Tufano, 1996, and Petersen and Thiagarajan, 1999, are notable
exceptions).  This analysis considers a more comprehensive set of activities than the use of
derivatives.  Section A describes the activities and the proxies for each activity.  The discussion in
                                                
15 The estimates in Figures 3a and 3b use fewer observations per parameter than those graphed in Figures 2a and 2b.
Specifically, the regressions supporting Figure 2a use 48/3 = 16 observations per coefficient while the regressions
underlying Figure 3a use 48/7 = 6.9 observations per coefficient.  The parameter estimates displayed in Figure 3 may
be intrinsically more unreliable, ceteris paribus.20
Section A focuses on the time-series patterns in these activities over the sample period as regulation
changed price risk exposures.  The variables that are used as proxies for these activities are all
scaled, thus inflation adjusting is not necessary.  Section B examines whether the sample firms use
the eight activities as complements or substitutes.  In addition, Section B examines the
characteristics of firms that make different activity choices.
[INSERT TABLE V HERE.]
A. Summary of strategies for managing risk
A.1 Financial derivative instruments
Firms can use exchange-traded or over-the-counter derivative instruments to manage
natural gas price risk.  We measure a firm's use of financial derivative instruments using an
indicator variable (DERIV).  For each sample year, DERIV is equal to one if the firm reports
having outstanding commodity derivatives at fiscal year-end or reports using commodity
derivatives during the year, and equal to zero otherwise.  We use an indicator variable because
measures of the magnitude of off-balance sheet activities are inconsistent or missing due to limited
disclosure requirements during the sample period.  Although notional amounts or market values are
available for some sample firms, the sample size would be greatly reduced by using a continuous
measure of derivatives activities.  Data on the use of derivatives are obtained from 10-K filings and
annual reports and are available from 1990 through 1995.
All commodity derivatives users are considered "hedgers" even though the use of
derivatives can imply speculation rather than risk reduction (Géczy, Minton and Schrand [1997]).
Several firms (i.e., El Paso Natural Gas, Questar, and Enron) report that derivatives are used both
for risk management and trading.  The use of natural gas derivatives for trading is consistent with
the claim that trading in derivatives can be a positive NPV activity for a firm that believes it has
“insider” knowledge of prices.
16  Although the use of derivatives can reflect speculation, the data
do not allow a better specification of hedgers because firms have been required to report if
                                                
16 For example, Stulz (1996) discusses the trading of interest-rate based derivatives by Banc One.21
derivative instruments are used for trading (SFAS No. 119) only for fiscal years ending after
December 15, 1994.
Table V reports an increasing trend in the use of commodity derivatives.  In 1990, 19% of
the sample firms used commodity instruments.  By 1995, 85% of the sample firms used
commodity derivatives (all but two firms).  The increase from 1990 to 1995 is statistically
significant based on a t-test of the differences in the cross-sectional means across years.  Similarly,
Haushalter (1999) reports that 58% of his sample of oil and gas producers use commodity
derivatives in 1994.  As Table V reports, the use of interest rate and currency derivatives also
increases from 1990 to 1995 and the increase in the use of interest rate derivatives from 1990 to
1995 is statistically significant.
The increase in commodity derivatives activity is consistent with the increased risk
exposures of pipelines related to deregulation and with an increase in expertise related to using
these instruments.  Exchange-traded natural gas price derivatives are a relatively recent innovation.
The first natural gas futures contract began trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange in April
1990.  In October 1992, the exchange launched options on natural gas futures.  Prior to the 1990s,
firms could cross-hedge using exchange-traded products based on oil prices to manage gas price
risk.  Although the spot price changes of oil and natural gas are highly correlated, there is basis
risk associated with this hedging strategy.  Haushalter (1999) notes that the coefficient of variation
of monthly natural gas prices from January 1991 to January 1995 was 0.205 while that of monthly
oil prices was 0.116.  Of course, the introduction of exchange-traded natural gas derivatives is not
exogenous but is an outcome that is likely related to the deregulation that created a demand for
these instruments.
17
                                                
17 Petzel (1989) indicates five criteria for a successful futures contract, the first of which is that "there is a sizeable
pool of assets or income at risk" (p. 3).  Although there was a large pool of natural gas-related assets and income
prior to price deregulation, it was not "at risk" of market price movements until deregulation.22
A.2 Contracting (OTC price fixing)
Long-term contracts are another tool to manage cash flow volatility related to input and
output prices in the natural gas industry (Masten and Crocker, 1985).
18  Natural gas pipeline
companies used two types of long-term contracts prior to 1978 (the start of our sample period) and
through the mid-1980s.  Together, the take-or-pay contracts with producers and the corresponding
contracts with consumers that contained minimum bill clauses mitigate price and quantity risk.  The
intuition that long-term contracting can be used as a risk management tool is supported by
theoretical arguments in Hubbard and Weiner (1986) which analyzes markets with both regulation
and bargaining possibilities.
Time-series predictions about the use of contracting to manage risk are not unambiguous.
The increasing exposure of pipelines to price risk over the sample period suggests that the use of
long-term contracts as a risk management tool will increase.  However, changes in the regulation
of these contracts during the sample period potentially had a countervailing effect.  FERC Order
380 (1984) which allowed end users to renege on minimum bill provisions but did not allow
pipelines to renege on take-or-pay obligations showed pipelines first-hand the regulatory risk
associated with these contracts.  As a result, natural gas pipelines and producers were involved in
numerous lawsuits as industry profitability declined in the late 1980s and the related acrimony
between the potential contracting parties decreased the use of such privately negotiated contracts in
favor of exchange-traded instruments.
19  In summary, we predict that the regulatory unbundling of
sale and transmission services led to a decrease in the use of long-term contracting.
Our proxy for the use of take-or-pay contracts (TOP) is the cost associated with gas
purchases that are covered by take-or-pay contracts, scaled by revenues from gas activities (as
reported in the FERC 2 annual report).  For the period from 1978 to 1989, data on the costs
associated with take-or-pay related gas purchases are reported annually in the Statistics of Interstate
                                                
18 Certain end users also had access to short-term spot contracts beginning in 1978 with section 311 of the NGPA.
Unlike long-term contracts that were common in the 1970s, spot market transactions did not contain take-or-pay or
minimum bill clauses.  Hence, these contracts alleviated concerns about contract risk and credit risk (Fitzgerald and
Pokalsky, 1995).  However, firms using these contracts have greater exposure to changes in wellhead natural gas
prices than firms using long-term contracts.  Data on the firm-specific use of short-term contracts are not available.
Data on the industry-wide use of short-term contracts indicates that these contracts accounted for 70 to 80% of the
market by 1989.
19 We thank Charles Smithson for noting this dimension of the contracting process.23
Natural Gas Companies.  After 1989, these data are available only if the firm voluntarily reports
take-or-pay costs in the annual report.  The cost of gas purchased under take-or-pay obligations is
an imperfect measure of the use of such contracts.  However, data on quantities under contract are
not consistently available.
Table V reports that the costs related to gas purchased under take-or-pay contracts increased
as regulation changed price risk exposure during the 1980s.  The mean (median) take-or-pay costs
as a percent of sales increases from 0.8% (0.2%) in 1979 to 3.7% (2.9%) in 1987 and is
statistically significant.  The increase is consistent with anecdotal claims of increased use of these
contracts related to natural gas shortages and price deregulation described in Section III in the early
1980s.
20  The increase, however, is not consistent with the use of take-or-pay contracts as a risk
management tool.  During this period, end users did not have to comply with the minimum bill
provisions with the pipelines (FERC Order 380).  Consequently, pipeline firms with significant
take-or-pay arrangements faced greater risk than firms that had decreased the use of these
contracts.  Footnotes to firms' annual reports and anecdotal evidence suggest that the higher take-
or-pay costs resulted because take-or-pay provisions contained in contracts initiated in the early
1980s (specifically, large quantities of gas at newly deregulated higher prices) were being triggered
as the demand for natural gas declined.  Firms, however, were not initiating new contracts with
take-or-pay provisions because customers were increasingly using short-term contracts to purchase
gas directly from producers in the spot market.
21
A.3 Operational changes
Firms also can change operating activities in response to changes in price risk exposure.
Natural gas pipelines have the flexibility to alter production or transmission prices and quantities.
Such changes in production plans to manage price risk are consistent with the findings of Tufano
(1996) that gold firms adjust their extraction plans, at least partially, to changes in gold prices.
                                                
20 The increase in the medians is also statistically significant.
21 Castaneda and Smith (1996) note this change in the industry using Panhandle Eastern as an example: “When large
utility customers discarded their long-term contracts with minimum bill provisions in favor of short-term contracts
in the spot market, Panhandle Eastern had no choice but to scale back its own long-term gas supply programs during
the last half of 1982.” (Castaneda and Smith, 1996, page 221.)24
Multi-segment holding companies also have the option to shift resources across activities within
the gas industry (e.g., from transmission to exploration and production), or to other industries
(e.g., from gas to oil or railroad).  The risk management effects of diversification are described in
Sections A.4 and A.5.  Clearly, because operational strategies involve investment and financing,
these strategies affect more than just a firm's exposure to price changes.  Firms presumably
consider both the price risk effects and other risk/return effects when evaluating operational
changes (Schrand and Unal, 1998).
Gas storage is one operating activity that significantly affects a firm's exposure to risk in
the natural gas industry.  Storage of gas underground is the physical equivalent of using gas
futures to purchase gas quantities for future delivery in terms of its impact on price risk exposure.
Consistent with the use of long positions in derivatives, storage reduces the volatility of cash flows
by mitigating a pipeline's exposure to fluctuating prices or demand (Susmel and Thompson,
1997).
22  Thus, higher storage implies greater hedging.  We measure storage (STORAGE) as the
billions of cubic feet (bcf) of gas in underground storage at fiscal year end scaled by the total
quantity of gas sales and deliveries (in bcfs) for the year.  The gas in underground storage includes
the amounts in both the current and non-current sections of the FERC 2 balance sheet.
The storage data in Table V illustrate no obvious trend in underground storage activities
during the sample period.  None of the changes in average or median storage levels for the reported
years are statistically different from zero, and the standard deviations of storage levels are high.
One explanation for the lack of significance is the required unbundling of transportation and
marketing activities.  Because of this unbundling, there was less uncertainty for pipelines about
demand for gas.  Thus, while price risk was increasing following deregulation and storage is
predicted to increase to mitigate this risk, precautionary demand risk was decreasing.  We cannot
disentangle these effects.  In addition, the benefits of storage as a risk management tool depend on
the level and volatility of gas prices which affect the implicit net cost of storage (Williams, 1986).
                                                
22 See Williams (1986) and the writings of Working (1977) for the theory of storage.  As a speculator, if a natural
gas firm expects prices to increase (decrease), one would expect the firm to store more (less) gas.  In addition to
expected prices affecting the storage decision, the level of the price also matters.  The higher the price level, the more
costly it is for the firm to store the gas.  We are currently working on incorporating the effects of price levels and
price expectations into our measure of storage.25
A.4 Line-of-business diversification
The exposure of cash flows to fluctuations in natural gas prices will be lower for firms that
engage in lines of business other than natural gas transmission or production assuming that the risk
exposures of a firm's non-gas segments are not positively correlated with gas prices.
23  We
consider two measures of diversification.  NUMSEG is the number of separate business segments
for each firm-year observation.  We summarize the segments defined by four-digit SIC codes on
Compustat into nine categories: (1) natural gas transmission and distribution; (2) natural gas and oil
production and processing; (3) refining and marketing; (4) coal and minerals; (5) electric; (6) rail,
trucking, and transportation; (7) real estate and properties; (8) services; and (9) other.
24
NUMSEG has a minimum of one and a maximum of nine.  Firms with more segments are
assumed to have greater diversification and be more hedged, all else equal.
The second proxy for diversification reflects the concentration of the firm-year observations
in particular segments.  CONC is a revenue-based Herfindahl index defined by Comment and
Jarrell (1995) as:











where REVSijt is the revenue from segment i for firm j in period t and N is the number of segments
reported by firm i in period t.  The maximum CONC is one for a firm with a single segment.  A
lower concentration ratio implies that the firm is more diversified and is thus more hedged.
                                                
23 This benefit of diversification seems to contrast with results in the existing literature that diversification decreases
firm value (e.g., Berger and Ofek, 1995, Comment and Jarrell, 1995, Lang and Stulz, 1994, and Rajan, Servaes, and
Zingales, 1998).  However, these pooled results do not consider whether diversification of price risk across the
individual entities within the diversified firm is associated with cross-sectional differences in the value-enhancement
or value-destruction of diversification.  We are not aware of any empirical evidence either supporting or refuting this
claim.  However, anecdotal evidence suggests that natural gas companies diversified in the 1970s in an attempt to
provide alternative energy sources and supplemental gas supplies, and, perhaps, to allay increases in price risk
(Castaneda and Smith, 1996).
24 The primary SIC codes of the segments in each category are: (1) includes 4922, 4923, and 4924; (2) is 1311; (3)
is 2911; (4) includes 1429 and 1222; (5) is 4911; (6) includes 4011, 4213, 4449, and 4581; (7) includes 6500
through 6600; (8) includes 7000 and higher, and (9) is all other SIC codes.26
Changes in CONC shown in Table V clearly indicate that firms increased diversification
over the sample period as deregulation increased natural gas price risk.  Although the number of
segments does not change significantly during the sample period, the mean (and median)
concentration of the sample firms' segments exhibit statistically significant decreases from 0.722
(0.706) in 1979 to 0.598 (0.522) in 1995.  This trend toward diversification is opposite the trend
away from diversification that was occurring during this time period for American firms in general.
Comment and Jarrell (1995) show that the average level of focus across all exchange-listed firms
on Compustat increased steadily from 0.683 in 1978 to 0.840 in 1989.
A.5 Mergers, takeovers, acquisitions and divestitures
As stated in section A.3, asset acquisitions and divestitures can be related to changes in a
firm’s concentration.  For example, acquisitions of non-gas related segments or divestitures of gas-
related segments will result in a more diversified firm.  Acquisitions and divestitures, however,
also can affect a firm's price risk exposure without necessarily leading to diversification.  Thus, we
consider mergers, takeovers, acquisitions and divestitures as a separate risk-related activity from
diversification.  Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) argue that takeovers (mergers) represent a "cheap
and quick" alternative to internal expansion in the face of positive demand shocks.  Conversely,
Dutz (1989) suggests that industry-wide negative demand shocks provide firms with incentives to
combine the best parts of each other’s assets in order to rationalize existing capacity.
25  As demand
falls, firms first stop investing in new productive assets, all else equal, and then allow certain
assets to become idle.
In addition, consistent with the theoretical arguments about the effects of acquisitions and
divestitures, empirical evidence suggests that deregulation and merger activities are correlated.
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) note that takeovers during the 1980’s were clustered in time and that
the time-clustering differed across industries.  In particular, they note that over 67% of firms in the
natural gas industry are the subjects of some form of takeover bid, more of which were hostile
(38% of bids were hostile, and 29% were friendly).  Similarly, Comment and Schwert (1995)
                                                
25 See Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) for a brief discussion of Dutz (1989) as it relates to takeovers.27
suggest that the decline in takeovers in the late 1980s was motivated by economic factors rather
than firm-specific anti-takeover measures or legal prohibitions against takeover activity.
We use two measures of pipeline acquisition and divestiture activity during the sample
period.  CHPIPE represents the net increase or decrease in the number of natural gas pipelines
owned by the sample firms.  CHMILES represents the percentage change in the number of
transmission miles for the sample firms.  Both CHPIPE and CHMILES are calculated using year-
end data reported in FERC 2 filings.  The proxies measure changes that occurred because of both
construction and acquisition/divestiture.  The relation between changes in the number and miles of
pipelines and risk exposure is not clear.  Decreases can be a direct attempt to decrease gas price risk
exposure.  However, increases in pipeline holdings also can decrease risk if they increase
geographic diversification.
We also analyze the number and dollar magnitude of the acquisitions and divestitures made
by the sample firms during the years 1978 to 1995.  Data on acquisitions and divestitures were
obtained from annual report footnote descriptions of significant activities and Mergerstat reports
available on Lexis/Nexis.  The transactions are classified as either gas-related or non-gas (NG)
related based on the same criteria used to classify segments.  For each group, we separately
measure the number of acquisitions and divestitures for each firm-year observation and the mean
deal value (as reported by Mergerstat or by the firm in its annual report) scaled by sales for the year
in which the deal was closed.  Data availability leads to a potential sample bias in the measurement
of acquisition and divestiture activities.  Mergerstat reports appear to be more comprehensive after
the mid-1980s, but annual reports were likely equally comprehensive during the sample period.
Since footnotes report only "significant" deals, the change in Mergerstat reporting implies that the
number of acquisitions and divestitures is likely to be understated in the earlier sample years
relative to the later sample years.  However, the mean deal values are likely overstated in the earlier
years when only the deals reported in the annual report are included for the sample.
Table V reports more frequent activity in the early 1980s as measured by CHPIPE but the
actual miles are increasing more in the 1990s.  The differences between the medians for CHMILES
in 1979 versus 1987, 1984 versus 1987, and 1987 versus 1990 are significantly different from28
zero.  The increase in CHMILES in 1979 is due to the reclassification of pipelines from minor in
1978 to major in 1979 for Texas Eastern Corporation.  Without this firm, the average percentage
change in pipeline miles is 1.10% in 1979.  The large CHPIPE observation of 0.217 in 1984 is the
result of three pipeline acquisitions by Midcon.  If Midcon is excluded from the sample for 1984,
the average CHPIPE is 0.091.
The increases in miles without corresponding increases in the number of pipelines reflects
the nature of growth in the natural gas industry.  By the late 1970s, firms had a basic infrastructure
of pipelines in place.  Growth resulted from the extension of existing lines rather than the
development of new pipelines.
26  The trend of increasing miles also corresponds to the increase in
natural gas usage documented in Table III.  However, the increases in miles, achieved both
through construction and through acquisitions in the natural gas industry, do not increase focus as
measured by CONC.  Rather, CONC is decreasing.  At the same time that the firms are increasing
their natural gas holdings, firms are increasing acquisitions outside the natural gas industry and are
also increasing divestitures of natural gas entities.
A.6 Cash buffers
Natural gas companies can manage cash flow volatility associated with gas price risk by
holding internal buffers of liquid assets.  We measure internal cash holdings (CASH) as the ratio
of cash to total assets minus cash consistent with Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson
(1999).
27  This variable is measured for the gas subsidiary alone using FERC Form 2 data and for
the pipeline holding company based on COMPUSTAT.  We predict that larger cash holdings
represent a hedge of cash flow risk, consistent with the findings of Opler et al (1999) that cash
buffers are positively associated with the industry-level cash flow volatility.
28  The results do not
reveal a clear time-series pattern in the trend of cash holdings.  However, using the cash balance
                                                
26 For example, in its 1992 annual report, PG&E describes an expansion project as follows: "The Company is
constructing an expansion of its natural gas transmission system from the Canadian border into California.  The 840
miles long pipeline will provide an additional 148 MMcf/d of firm capacity to the Pacific Northwest and an
additional 755 MMcf/d of firm capacity to California."
27 Measuring cash holdings on the last day of the year produces a noisy proxy for average cash holdings which is the
variable of interest.  We also use the average quarterly cash holdings for the parent company.  The results are similar.
28Opler et al (1999) test a variety of theories about the determinants of cash holdings in addition to the theory that
cash reserves reduce the costs of cash flow volatility.  The results indicate that cash holdings are positively associated
with growth opportunities, firm size, and credit ratings.29
only at year-end likely measures the concept of "cash holdings" with error.
29  The cross-sectional
relations between cash holdings and other activities in Section C are more revealing.
A.7 Regulatory rate adjustments
In the absence of long-term contracts, changes in input gas prices (to either the producer or
the pipeline) can be passed through to customers (either the pipeline or the end user).  Thus, the
sample firms potentially have a natural hedge of cash flow volatility associated with gas price
changes.  The effectiveness of this hedge depends on the elasticity of prices.  The delivery end of
the business to large industrial consumers like electric utilities was and is competitive after price
deregulation and competition moderates the pass through of price changes.  Even for rate-regulated
activities, the effectiveness of this hedging strategy is limited.  Regulated entities are forced to
appeal to their governing regulatory bodies to obtain higher delivery prices based on effective rates
of return.  The rate adjustments on the output side occur after the firm has incurred costs on the
input side because historical costs rather than anticipated costs are used to justify the need for rate
increases, and the appeals process is not timely.  The timing of rate adjustments reduces the
effectiveness of this activity as a hedge of internal cash flow volatility, even though the regulated
firms are subject to less earnings volatility.  However, access to regulatory rate adjustments will
reduce overall cash flow volatility if external capital markets understand the rate-making process,
anticipate recoveries, and fund internal cash shortfalls.
We identify firms that are able to use regulatory rate adjustments to mitigate price risk as
those that follow Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 71 to account for their gas
operations.  SFAS 71, "Accounting for the Effects of Certain Types of Regulation," allows for
specialized accounting treatment for costs that a firm expects to recover through rate regulation.
Specifically, certain firms are permitted to defer recoverable costs and report the costs only when
the offsetting revenue is recorded.  The deferral of costs is allowed only for firms that meet the
standard's criteria to qualify as a "regulated enterprise."  The criteria are designed to identify firms
                                                
29 We also measured cash holdings at the parent level using quarterly data; the results are similar.30
that are likely to be able to recover costs through rate regulation.
30  Thus, the fact that a firm
follows SFAS 71 indicates that it has regulatory rate adjustments available as a cash flow hedging
tool.
31
Approximately one half of the sample firms meet (or have a subsidiary that meets) the
criteria to follow SFAS No. 71.  Firms that meet the criteria generally meet the criteria in all years.
However, there are a few cases when one pipeline within the parent's holdings becomes compliant
or falls out of compliance with the criteria but other holdings remain compliant.  Thus, this variable
does not change over time for a given firm and it is not reported in Table V.  In Section C, we
examine the correlation between other risk-related activities and access to regulatory rate
adjustments.
A.8 Accounting earnings management
We consider two earnings management activities that affect the volatility of reported
earnings.  Some of these activities also are considered by Petersen and Thiagarajan (1999) for two
firms in the gold industry.
First, we examine the reporting of special items.  Under generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP), a special item is any income or cost that is either extraordinary or infrequent
but not both.
32  Common examples of special items include litigation and restructuring charges,
reserves, losses due to a permanent impairment in the value of an asset, and gains or losses on
sales of assets (including subsidiaries).  Because of the conservatism principle of GAAP, special
items are more likely to be charges than income.  Not all special items are discretionary.  However,
prior literature has argued that firms can exercise discretion in the timing of reporting special items
(e.g., Pourciau, 1993) or in the timing of engaging in the events that create special items (e.g.,
Bartov, 1993).
                                                
30 In summary the three criteria require that (1) there is a regulator with the authority to set rates, (2) the rates are
linked to specific costs, and (3) collection based on set is reasonable and likely.
31 SFAS 71 was effective for fiscal years beginning after December 31, 1983; earlier application was encouraged.
The standard was preceded by a discussion memorandum issued December 31, 1979 and an exposure draft issued
March 4, 1982.  Although the actual accounting was not in place during the entire sample period, the use of this
variable to classify firms is reasonable.
32 If an item is both unusual and infrequent, then the income or cost is classified as extraordinary.  As the name
implies, these items do not occur regularly and there were too few in our sample to draw any conclusions.31
We use annual report data to categorize total special items from Compustat into three types:
restructuring charges, oil and gas-related (O&G) reserves, and other.  Restructuring charges and
O&G reserves are measured as the amount of the annual charge scaled by sales revenue and these
amounts are always negative.  Other special items are measured as the absolute value of other
special items scaled by sales.  The major contributors to "other" special items are reserves for
potential litigation settlements or environmental remediation costs, pension/retirement-related
settlements, and take-or-pay contract settlement costs.
Table V indicates that restructuring charges increased on average over the sample period
which is consistent with the increase in restructuring charges across all industries as documented
by Elliott and Hanna (1996).  However, none of the average increases are statistically significant
due to the small number of firms taking these charges.  Although the median charge is zero, when
taken, the charges can be large.  For example, in 1986, including the firms that take zero charges,
the average charge is -0.225.  The largest restructuring charge was $2.169 billion (10% of sales)
by Occidental Petroleum in 1990.  While taking a restructuring charge is not an earnings
management activity, per se, firms can manage the timing of the charge.  In addition, the SEC has
accused firms of including regular operating expenses for future periods in restructuring charges to
improve future operating earnings (Elliott and Hanna, 1996).  Thus, documenting these charges
provides insights about the nature of the other proxy variables that measure risk-related activities.
For example, divestitures can occur alone or as part of a significant restructuring and the charges
help identify which situation occurs.
Oil and gas reserves and other special items also increase over the sample period.  The
increase in oil and gas reserves is consistent with the poor economic conditions in the natural gas
markets and decrease in oil and gas prices that reduced the estimated market value of oil and gas
inventories and properties.  The increases in special items are due to higher litigation and
environmental costs and increases in acquisition and divestiture activity that generate significant
gains/losses.  The increase in litigation charges is at least partially related to lawsuits over take-or-
pay settlements based on our review of footnotes to financial statements about the nature of special
items.32
The second earnings management activity that we consider is a firm’s choice of accounting
policies.  In particular, we consider the accounting policy choices related to inventory costing and
business combinations.
33  Related to oil and gas inventory, GAAP (SFAS 19) allows firms to
follow  one  of  two  methods for  accounting  for  acquisition, exploration  and  production  costs
associated with oil and/or gas reserves: the full cost (FC) method and the successful efforts (SE)
method.  Basically, the two methods differ on when the costs of  unsuccessful  production are
reported as part of income.
34  Under the SE method, costs related to unsuccessful exploration,
development or property acquisition are expensed when incurred.  Under the FC method, all costs
associated with acquisition, discovery and development of oil/gas -- successful or unsuccessful --
are capitalized as an asset and amortized into expense as part of the cost of inventory when the
related revenues on gas sales are recognized.
We consider firms that use the FC method to be hedgers based on the results of Collins,
Rozeff, and Dhaliwal (CRD, 1981).  First, CRD show that the full cost method generally leads to a
smoother earnings stream as unsuccessful costs are allocated across time.  Second, CRD document
that abnormal  stock  returns  calculated  over  a  two-week  period  surrounding  the  Wall  Street
Journal’s report of the FASB’s Exposure draft for SFAS 19 in July 1977 are negatively related to
proxies  measuring  the  increased  contracting  costs  and  estimation  risk  associated  with  the
elimination (for some firms) of FC accounting.
However, one part of the FC calculations can lead to more volatile earnings.  Under the FC
method, ceiling tests require write-downs of gas inventories if the market value of the asset
(capitalized costs) is less than the book value because prices have fallen.  These write-downs,
which occur all in one period, can substantially reduce earnings and create volatility.
35
                                                
33 For a discussion of this earnings management tool and evidence that firms strategically time the adoption of
accounting standards, see Amir and Ziv, 1997, and Amir and Livnat, 1996.
34 The SEC allows firms to use the successful efforts method as stated in SFAS 19 or to use a "modified" full cost
method (Regulation S-X, Rule 4-10).  The SEC's full cost method limits the costs that can be capitalized by
requiring that firms form cost centers on a country-by-country basis and only capitalize costs that can be directly
ascribed to one of the cost centers (i.e., general corporate overhead cannot be capitalized).  The SEC also more clearly
specifies how the capitalized costs are to be amortized.  Finally, the SEC rule includes a ceiling test.  If the total
capitalized costs exceed a ceiling based on expected future revenues from gas sales, the capitalized costs must be
charged to expense immediately.  The SEC rules were proposed in ASR 253 (8-31-78) which stated that the SEC
would develop its own full cost method.  The SEC's full cost method was finalized in a 12-19-78 release.  Therefore,
the GAAP and SEC rules were in effect for our entire sample period.
35 Note that the write-downs that are related to the ceiling test are included in special items.33
Table V shows that most firms used the full cost method at the beginning of the sample
period.  However, during the sample period, nine firms changed from FC to SE (eight voluntarily)
and two firms changed from SE to FC (one voluntarily).  By 1995, half of the sample firms used
the successful efforts method.
36  The first group is considered less hedged as a result of the switch
from the FC to SE method.  Overall, firms' discussions of these changes suggests that switches
were undertaken to manage the current period level of earnings, but not necessarily the volatility of
earnings.  Three of the nine voluntary changes increased net income in the change year from a
negative amount to a positive amount.  Four of the nine switchers experienced credit downgrades
in the year of the change and none experienced upgrades.  In addition, four of the eight voluntary
changes from the FC method to the SE method occurred in 1985.
37  Prices had been increasing
during the sample period from 1979 through 1984 but then dropped from a high of $2.71 in
February 1985 to $2.31 in December 1985.  This price decrease would have triggered a write-
down under the FC method so the change to the SE method increased income in the year of the
change.  For these firms, net income changed from negative to positive in the year of the change.
The second accounting method choice that we consider is the choice between pooling and
purchasing when a firm is engaging in a business combination.  This "choice" differs from the
inventory method choice in two important ways.  First, the choice of accounting for business
combinations is transaction-based.  The structure of the transaction dictates the accounting method,
but firms "choose" the structure of the transaction.  In very general terms, the purchase method is
used for cash deals and the pooling method is used for stock deals.  Thus, this “choice” has an
impact on (or is a result of) the firm's cash holdings.  Second, the main effect of the choice is on
current period earnings, not on volatility of current and future-period earnings.
Considering only the accounting implications of structuring a deal, firms will prefer
poolings for two reasons.  First, in a pooling, consolidated earnings are reported as if the
combination occurred at the beginning of the reporting period even if the acquisition takes place on
December 31.  In a purchase, only the earnings of the acquired firm that occurred after the
                                                
36 Non-voluntary switches result from mergers with other entities that are following a different policy or corporate
reorganizations.
37Although the timing of the changes is consistent with an attempt to avoid the ceiling limits under the FC method,
these firms stated that the FASB had expressed a preference for the SE method.34
acquisition date are included in consolidated earnings.  Thus, as long as earnings of the acquired
entity are positive, pooling leads to higher reported income for the acquirer.  Second, in a
purchase, the acquirer records an asset, goodwill, that represents the difference between the
purchase price and the market value of all identifiable assets of the acquired firm.  Because there is
no goodwill in a pooling, there is no drain on future-period earnings when this asset is expensed.
38
For these reasons, although the impact on "volatility" per se is not clear, we consider the pooling
method of accounting for acquisitions to be a hedging activity.
While we would like to examine whether firms that need the earnings increase that a
pooling can provide (e.g., financially distressed firms) are more likely to engage in pooling
transactions, the data do not allow such an analysis.  For both the 47 non-gas (NG) related firm
observations (more acquisitions as some had multiple acquisitions but never mixed methods) and
the 41 firm-year observations of non-NG acquisitions for which we know the accounting method,
approximately 85% used the purchase method.  The thirteen poolings that are done by eight firms
are uniformly distributed across the years.  For eight of the thirteen poolings, the firms disclose
that the transaction had an immaterial impact on earnings.  Thus, these firms do not disclose "as if"
earnings without the pooling and we cannot assess the pre-pooling financial condition of the firm.
C. Hedging activities as substitutes and complements
In this section, we use two separate analysis techniques to examine the relations among the
activities discussed in the previous section.  The goal is to show which activities are substitutes or
complements.  In the first exercise, firms are classified as "hedgers" and "non-hedgers" based on
each separate activity defined in the previous section.  Within each classification of "hedgers" and
"non-hedgers", we examine the means of the other proxy variables.  This approach provides the
most direct illustration of the relations among each activity.  A disadvantage of this approach is that
the results are univariate.  Another disadvantage is that it requires that we define a "hedger" for
each of the activities discussed in the previous section.  This task is ad hoc, especially for the
                                                
38 See Vincent (1997) for a discussion of the benefits of pooling accounting over purchase accounting that are
hypothesized to lead to a share price premium for pooling firms.35
activities for which we have a continuous measure.  There is no clear definition of the levels of
these variables that constitutes "hedging."
The second exercise is factor analysis to determine which of the activities associated with
gas price risk load up on unobserved common or unique factors.  The factor analysis explicitly
indicates the activities that are related in the sense that a common factor contributes to the variance
of the observed proxies.  A disadvantage of the factor analysis in this particular study is data
constraints.  Because observations included in the analysis must have data available for all input
activities, we face a trade-off between the number of activities included in the analysis and the
number of observations available to estimate the factors.  As we discuss below, we use several
combinations of input variables and interpolation of the final factor scores to mitigate the problems
created by our small sample size.  Although there are benefits and disadvantages of both the
univariate analysis and the factor analysis, together the results of the two analyses lead to similar
conclusions.
C.1  Univariate Analysis
The results of the univariate analysis in which we classify firms as hedgers and non-
hedgers on the basis of each risk-related activity are reported in Table VI.  A firm's classification as
a hedger or non-hedger can change by year.  For strategies that are measured by dichotomous
variables, such as users and non-users of derivatives, the table indicates which group is defined as
hedgers.  For strategies that are measured by continuous variables, firms are ranked into triciles
(thirds) annually based on the proxy variable and designated as high (HI) or low (LOW) if the firm
is in the highest or lowest tricile, respectively.  The table indicates whether the HI or LOW firms
are hedgers.  The data on the means of the other proxy variables are pooled for the firms within
each group across all sample years.
[INSERT TABLE VI HERE.]36
Three main results emerge from Table VI.  First, the use of financial derivatives as a risk
management tool is a substitute for holding a cash buffer and for storing gas underground.
Moreover, the latter two activities are complements to each other.  Second, accounting earnings
management strategies are not complements to activities that have a "real" effect on cash flow
volatility.  Finally, diversification is not related to financial hedging activities.  The analysis shows
that more diversified firms are less likely to be rate-regulated, and that greater diversification is
related to lower storage and the use of successful efforts accounting.  However, these documented
associations likely represent fundamental differences between the underlying operations of the
more diversified firms and less diversified firms rather than a risk-management phenomenon.
The first panel of Table VI, which classifies firms as hedgers and non-hedgers based on
their use of commodity derivatives, shows that hedgers hold significantly less cash (measured at
the pipeline level) and store lower quantities of gas underground.  Likewise, firms that are in the
lower-third of the sample with respect to gas storage are significantly more likely to use commodity
derivatives and hold significantly lower cash buffers than hedgers.  Firms that hold more cash are
less likely to use derivatives (this difference is not statistically different from zero) and hold
significantly higher quantities of storage.  Thus, cash holdings and gas storage are complements to
each other and substitutes for derivatives use.
There are no clear trends between the use of accounting earnings management and either
diversification or the use of financial derivatives.  There is a positive relation between special items
and storage.  However, this relation appears to be driven by the accounting for storage.  Several of
the special charges are write-downs based on the ceiling tests required by the full cost method of
accounting for reserves.  Thus, firms with more gas in storage are more likely to have special items
(write-downs) of this type.
Finally, the last panel of Table VI, which presents the results for firms classified as hedgers
or non-hedgers based on whether the firm meets the definition of a rate-regulated entity under
SFAS 71, suggests that the rate-regulated firms are significantly different than the non-regulated
firms.  The results show associations between the variables, not causality.  Clearly, some of the
proxy variables are determinants of rate regulation.  For example, firms that are rate-regulated37
store higher levels of gas and are significantly more likely to use the full cost method of
accounting, and this accounting choice is likely related to the nature of the operating activities of
these firms.  However, other variables are likely the effects of regulation or the firm characteristics
associated with being a rate-regulated entity.  Although the endogeneity issues related to this
variable preclude us from making statements about rate-making as a risk management activity, the
documented associations among the risk-related activities are still interesting.  For example, rate-
regulated firms hold significantly less cash as a buffer and are significantly less likely to use
commodity derivatives.  In addition to the lack of financial hedging by the rate-regulated firms, the
firms are significantly less diversified as measured by the concentration ratio.
39
C.2. Factor Analysis
The results of the factor analysis are presented in Table VII.  The factor analysis identifies
six factors that have eigenvalues greater than one.  Together these factors retain approximately 70%
of the variation in the input variables.  The table presents the factor scores after oblique rotation.
40
These scores are used to calculate firm and year-specific proxies for the combinations of hedging
activities identified in this factor analysis.  The details of the calculation of the proxy variables are
described following the discussion of the factors.
The input variables to the factor analysis represent thirteen of the proxies identified as
activities that affect gas price risk.  These thirteen proxies were chosen to maximize data
availability.  When there are two proxies that measure the same economic construct, such as
NUMSEG and CONC that measure diversification, only one of the two variables was included in
the analysis.  The analysis is done using panel data for the period 1990-1995 so that the derivatives
variables can be included.  We also perform the same analysis for the entire sample period with the
exception that the derivatives variables are excluded.  The factor loadings are similar for the five
                                                
39 These results related to the concentration ratio are not driven by the rate regulation criteria.  Firms can follow
SFAS 71 for segments within the firm as long as the segment meets the accounting criteria.  It is not necessary for
the entire firm to meet the criteria of SFAS 71.  Thus, it is not the case that less diversified firms are more likely to
meet the criteria, ceteris paribus.
40 We use the Promax oblique transformation method in SAS.38
non-derivative factors.  Thus, the availability of derivatives does not significantly alter the
correlations among the use of other risk management strategies.
[INSERT TABLE VII HERE.]
The six factors have intuitive economic interpretations.  The variables with significant
loadings for the first factor, which we label the “operating activities factor,” are cash buffers,
storage, and diversification.  The signs indicate that holding more cash, greater storage, and less
concentration (i.e., more diversification), all of which reduce price risk exposure, are related.  The
variables with significant loadings for the second factor, which is denoted the “financial hedging
factor,” are the use of commodity and other derivatives (foreign exchange rate or interest rate).
The loadings are positive for both of these variables.
The third factor, the "restructuring factor", has significant loadings on the two variables
that measure the extent of divestitures by the firm related to both natural gas and other segments
and on the variable that measures the restructuring charges taken by the firm (a component of
special items).  Note that the signs indicate that firms are concurrently engaging in extensive
divestitures and taking significant restructuring charges (a negative special item).  As noted
previously, the time-series pattern of the use of restructuring charges does not suggest that these
charges were used to manage earnings volatility.  However, including this variable in the factor
analysis is useful for better understanding the role of divestitures as a risk management activity.
As evidenced by the common loading of divestitures with restructuring charges, the
divestitures generally represent significant changes in the nature of firm's asset holdings.  There
are a total of 135 divestitures by the sample firms: 22 energy, 53 natural gas, and 60 other.  The
mean level of restructuring charges (as a percent of sales) equals -0.0045 for the 53 natural gas
divestitures, -0.0031 for the 60 other divestitures, and -0.0012 for the 22 energy-related
divestitures.  Restructuring charges scaled by sales has a correlation of -11% (statistically
significant) with the number of other divestitures and of -20% (statistically significant) with the
number of natural gas divestitures (recall that the charges are negative).  Combined with the39
evidence that the sample firms are decreasing focus through time as measured by the concentration
ratio, these results suggest that the natural gas divestitures, which lead to less focus, are associated
with significant restructuring plans.
The fourth "gas" factor represents two activities of the firm that are related to gas prices: the
percentage change in pipeline miles (CHMILES), which is the proxy for the acquisition and
divestiture activity, and the component of special items that represents write-offs due to decreasing
oil and gas prices (ceiling test write-offs and provisions for losses due to permanent asset
impairment).  The special item related to oil and gas reserves does not measure "hedging" per se,
but provides confirmation about the interpretation of the other proxy, CHMILES.  A decrease in
the percentage of pipeline miles owned is related to an increase in the oil and gas charges.  Thus,
the firms that are decreasing pipeline miles are doing so at the time that oil and gas prices are
falling.
41
The loadings on the fifth and sixth factors represent the variables that measure acquisitions
within and outside the natural gas industry, respectively.  Finally, other special items does not load
as a separate factor.
C.3. Firm characteristics and risk management activities
Table VIII reports characteristics of the firms that use the various risk management
strategies.  There are significant differences between the "hedgers" and the "non-hedgers" based on
the panel data reported in Table VIII, however, separate annual tests reveal less statistical
significance.
The results related to storage, cash holdings, and derivatives are interpreted in light of the
results in Table VI that the use of financial derivatives is a substitute for holding a cash buffer and
for storing gas underground, and that the latter two activities are complements.  Consistent with
this result, the firms that hold high cash buffers and store large quantities of gas are similar to each
                                                
41 One explanation for the association between changes in pipeline miles and the ceiling test write-downs is that the
falling oil and gas prices drive both variables.  However, the charges can also be taken as a means of managing
future period earnings.  In this case, the common factor indicates that the firms that are changing pipeline miles
represent firms that benefit from earnings management, such as firms in financial distress.  We cannot distinguish
these explanations for the common loading.40
other and significantly different from the "non-hedgers" in these categories.  In particular, the cash
"hedgers" (panel six) and the storage "hedgers" (panel two) are more profitable (higher operating
income ratios) and less financially distressed (higher interest coverage ratios, lower long-term debt
ratios, better S&P bond ratings, and higher dividend yields).  The hedgers also have lower market-
to-book ratios.  Thus, the same kinds of firms use storage and cash buffers, consistent with the
evidence that these two activities are complements.
By contrast, users of financial derivatives are unlike the storage and cash hedgers,
consistent with the evidence that derivatives are substitutes for the use of storage and cash.
Derivatives users (panel one) have lower profit margins and are more financially distressed as
evidenced by their worse S&P bond ratings, lower dividend yields, and higher market-to-book
ratios than non-hedgers.
The results in Table VI also indicated that there are no clear trends between the use of
accounting earnings management and either derivatives use or diversification.  In Table VIII, firms
that are classified as hedgers based on their use of full cost accounting have higher profit margins,
are larger and have lower long-term debt ratios than non-hedgers (firms which use successful
efforts accounting).  These characteristics are not shared by hedgers based on derivatives use,
measures of diversification, or storage.
Finally, as in Table VI, firms that follow SFAS 71 accounting (regulated firms) are
statistically different from firms that do not follow SFAS 71.  Regulated firms have higher profit
margins, better S&P bond ratings, higher interest coverage ratios, are smaller and have lower
market-to-book ratios.  The characteristics of the regulated firms are similar to those of the cash
and storage hedgers and unlike those of the derivative hedgers.  This result is consistent with the
result in Table VI that 69.5% of unregulated firms use derivatives while only 46% of regulated use
derivatives to hedge.  Mian (1996) also suggests that regulated firms are less likely to use
derivatives.  Although our results suggest differences between regulated firms and unregulated
firms with respect to hedging activities, the results obviously do not suggest causality.
 [INSERT TABLE VIII HERE.]41
We also use the factor scores to classify firms as hedgers and non-hedgers.  This
classification has the advantage that it considers that firms use multiple activities together and does
not classify firms based on the choice of a single activity as in the univariate analysis.  Using the
factor analysis as a means of defining hedgers and non-hedgers assumes that activities that load up
together are complements and both are used because of their relation to risk.
We create a proxy for operating-activity hedgers based on the first factor and a proxy for
financial hedgers based on the second factor.  To compute these firm and year-specific proxies, we
use the factor scores (after oblique rotation)
 from the previous section and the standardized input
variables.  The rotation provides scores that are easier to interpret economically but can potentially
produce correlated factors.  However, the rotation does not induce significant correlation in the
factors in this case based on an analysis of the correlations and semi-partial correlations between
the common factors and the input variables.
We create the factors by equally weighting only the input variables with significant factor
scores in the initial analysis (after rotation).  This procedure reduces measurement error associated
with inputs that have little impact on the factors.
42  In addition, we are able to create factors for a
greater number of firm-year observations.  The factor analysis is based on the 81 observations with
complete data to estimate the factors.  However, there are 125 observations during the post-1989
period.  The equally weighted factor scores are applied not only to the observations that are
included in the factor analysis but also to the observations that are excluded from the factor analysis
because they are missing data for at least one of the input variables.
Using factor two (financial hedging factor) to define hedgers and non-hedgers confirms the
previously stated univariate differences between commodity derivatives users and non-users
(results not tabulated).  Using factor one (operating activities factor) indicates further the relation
between hedging by holding cash, storing gas, and diversifying.  When the firms are classified as
hedgers and non-hedgers based on this factor, there are no significant differences between the two
                                                
42 The correlations between the factors that are based on all input variables and the equally-weighted factors for the 81
observations are between 92% and 97% for the first five factors.  For the sixth factor that represents other special
items, the correlation is 78%.42
groups.  This result occurs because diversification loads negatively on this factor while storage and
cash buffers load positively.  Further, the characteristics of firms that hedge through diversification
are generally opposite those of the firms that are defined as hedgers on the basis of cash buffers
and storage.
V. Equity price risk and hedging activities
This section links the natural gas price sensitivities perceived by the market to firm-specific
risk management activities.  We examine the relation between firms’ return sensitivities to changes
in wellhead prices from equation (2) and the various proxies for risk-management activities
including the financial risk management strategies as well as the non-derivative strategies and the
factor scores that attempt to create a measure of multiple hedging activities.
Table IX shows the results of annual cross-sectional regressions of wellhead betas (bNG )
and the absolute value of wellhead betas (|bNG |) on an intercept and each of the proxies for a risk-
related activity.  The table presents the mean of the annual cross-sectional coefficient estimates on
the risk-related proxies; results for the intercept are not presented.  The results indicate that gas
price betas are positively associated with gas storage and the use of successful efforts accounting.
However, the absolute magnitude of a firm’s gas price sensitivity, which is a better proxy for net
exposure regardless of its sign, is not associated with a firm’s accounting choice (i.e., full cost v.
successful efforts accounting).  Thus, we focus the discussion on the results of the regressions
using |bNG | as a dependent variable.
[INSERT TABLE IX HERE.]
The absolute value of bNG , or a firm’s net gas price exposure, is associated with the use of
take-or-pay contracts, net cash, concentration, factor 1 (operational hedges), and factor 2
(derivative hedges).  Table IX shows negative relations between |bNG | and take-or-pay costs as a
percent of sales and cash holdings.  These results indicate that more extensive use of long-term
contracts, as evidenced by a higher cost incurred on these contracts, and holding a greater buffer43
stock of cash, both of which are designated as hedging activities, are associated with a lower
overall exposure to gas price risk.  The relations between both of these risk proxies and the raw
gas price beta are not significantly different from zero.  Concentration ratios are positively
associated with |bNG | which suggests that more focused firms (less diversified and less well
hedged) have higher gas price sensitivities, on average.
The analysis of the relation between |bNG | and the factor scores indicates that combinations
of operating risk-related strategies are associated with gas price sensitivity.  On average firms with
higher cash, higher storage and greater diversification (factor 1) have lower gas price sensitivities
(in absolute value).  However, there is a positive association between |bNG | and the factor score
associated with using financial hedging of all types (commodity, interest rate, and foreign
exchange).  This unpredicted result is based on only six annual observations from 1990 through
1995.  In addition, the factor represents a summary of all financial hedging; the relation between
the use of commodity derivatives and |bNG |, which is also based on a small number of
observations, is insignificant.
The univariate analysis ignores the potential for combinations of risk management activities
to affect gas price betas and also masks the time-series pattern of rolling exposures.  Table X
provides an analysis of the rolling betas for portfolios of “hedgers” and “non-hedgers” that
attempts to correct these deficiencies, although the analysis is still constrained by the small sample
size.  First, we examine differences in the sensitivities of firms that use commodity derivatives
(denoted derivatives users) and firms that do not use commodity derivatives (non-users).  Second,
we consider differences in the sensitivities of firms that are defined as hedgers using the non-
derivatives strategies.  If a firm uses two or more of the other non-redundant available strategies
besides the use of derivatives, it is considered a “non-derivative hedger”.  Third, we consider
differences in the sensitivities of firms based on factor scores.  A firm is assigned to the factor
hedger portfolio in a given month if it has two or more factor values in the upper third of the
equally weighted factor score values discussed in the previous section.  The equally weighted
factor score values utilize data from all firms in the sample.  This imputation effectively avoids
discarding information for the majority of factor scores for a given firm if it is missing data in a44
given time period for one of the underlying characteristics that loads on a different factor.
Assigning firms as hedgers and non-hedgers on the basis of two or more of the six factors should
reduce noise relative to simply observing actual non-derivative hedging activities without further
analysis.  Finally Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the time-series pattern of wellhead price sensitivities for
“non-derivative hedgers” and hedgers classified based on factor values.
[INSERT TABLE X HERE.]
 [INSERT FIGURES 4 AND 5 HERE.]
Table X, Panel A, indicates that firms that disclose using commodity derivatives have
significantly smaller and less variable stock-price sensitivities to wellhead price changes than non-
hedgers.  The mean of the estimated bNGs for each 48-month period (the time series begins in
1990) for the portfolio of derivative hedgers is -0.005 and the estimates vary between -0.05 and
0.05.  In contrast, non-users of derivatives have an average exposure to wellhead price changes of
0.02 with a range of -0.04 to 0.80.  The similarity in the means and standard deviations of the
market betas, however, indicates that the two groups are not fundamentally different with respect
to systematic risk as specified in equation (2).  Rather, the difference between the groups is evident
only in their exposures to wellhead price returns.  Finally, only 2.7% of the sample of derivatives
hedgers have exposures that are statistically different from zero –- either negatively or positively –-
at the 10% level.  However, the fraction of the bNGs of non-hedgers that are different from zero is
12.8%.
Similarly, Panel B reports that the “other hedgers” have appreciably smaller gas price
sensitivities than non-hedgers.  The average natural gas price sensitivity of the hedger and non-
hedger portfolio is -0.0049 and 0.13, respectively, and ranges from -0.04 to 0.091.  The range of
estimates is narrower for firms comprised of other hedgers (-0.04 to 0.091) than for non-hedgers
(0.38 to 0.40).  The volatility of the rolling natural gas betas for other hedgers is 0.08 while that
for the non-hedger portfolio is 0.14.  In addition, the average market exposure of hedgers in Panel45
B is smaller than the non-hedgers average market exposure, a somewhat surprising finding
because hedgers by any method are typically larger in size than non-hedgers.
Figure 4a demonstrates that the time-series of rolling natural gas return betas for “non-
derivative hedgers” exhibits a pattern qualitatively similar to the time-series of rolling betas for the
entire sample.  Exposures are negative in the first part of the sample until the mid-1980's when
they cross the zero line.  Exposures then become negative again (but not significantly different
from zero) in the late 1980's.  In the early 1990's, after the genesis of both a futures market and
the final steps of market deregulation, exposures are positive for the remainder of the sample
period.
A key difference between the results for the entire sample (Figure 2a) and those for non-
derivative hedger portfolio (Figure 4a) is that the absolute values of the hedger-portfolio gas
exposures are smaller.  In the mid-1980's when exposures turn positive, the overall sample
portfolio gas exposure climbs above 0.20, while the hedger portfolio exposure reaches its sample
maximum of only 0.09.  Figure 4b, which plots the time-series of t-statistics corresponding to the
exposure estimates in Figures 4a, shows that for non-derivative hedgers, the significance levels of
the rolling exposure estimates are mostly below one in absolute value except near the end of the
sample.  In summary, the returns of firms that engage in non-derivative hedging strategies have
economically smaller and less variable sensitivities to natural gas price fluctuations during the
period of deregulation.
43
Panel C of Table X reports gas and market sensitivities for portfolios of hedgers and non-
hedgers classified using the factor analysis of the previous section. The results suggest that “factor
hedgers”, like both the non-derivative hedgers in Panel B and financial hedgers in Panel A, have
smaller, slightly negative average natural gas exposures with lower volatilities and a narrower
range of variation than the corresponding non-hedgers.  The mean average exposure of factor
hedgers is -0.018 while the factor non-hedger portfolio has a mean exposure of 0.11.  The hedger
bNG volatility over time is 0.028 while for non-hedgers it is 0.12.  The hedger range is -0.07 to
0.089 while the non-hedger range is -0.32 to 0.44.  Finally, only 1.7% of the hedger wellhead
                                                
43This conclusion is based on the reported statistics that are not adjusted for serial correlation in the estimates from
the rolling regressions (e.g., Hansen and Hodrick, 1980).46
return exposures is different statistically from zero while 12.3% of the non-hedger factor
exposures is different from zero.  Figure 5a illustrates that factor hedger exposures are small in
comparison to full sample exposures.  Figure 5b shows that the estimated exposures of factor
hedgers are never reliably different from zero.
In addition, factor hedgers appear to be less exposed to market variability.  Their average
market beta is 0.37 while the non-hedgers have an average beta of 0.66, a pattern very similar to
the non-derivatives case in Panel B.  This difference is somewhat unexpected because hedgers by
both derivatives-based classifications as well as factor and financial derivatives explanations are
generally larger in size and therefore might be expected to have betas nearer to one.  However, as
discussed in Géczy, Minton and Schrand (1997), a possible motive for derivatives use is financial
distress.  Firms in distress might have higher idiosyncratic variability that emerges in estimates of
overall market exposures.
Overall, in each of the cases presented, the exposures of the hedgers are lower, less
variable, and less frequently unconditionally statistically significant than those of the non-hedgers.
While ex ante hedger portfolio assignments are arbitrary, the results of this section demonstrate that
there are measurable differences in exposures between the two types of firms, regardless of a
possibly noisy classification procedure and the time-varying nature of the exposures through
deregulation changes.  In addition, controlling for complements and substitutes among hedging
choices and extracting common factors present in hedging activity variables clarifies the
classification.  The evidence that this clustering of firms’ activities improves our ability to
distinguish between firms with high exposures and low exposures suggests that the factor analysis
explains the complementary nature of the relations among the derivative and non-derivative risk-
related activities.
VI. Conclusion
We utilize a unique string of events associated with the deregulation of the natural gas
industry to examine how natural gas pipeline firms choose among alternative risk management
activities.  The significant regulatory changes were the deregulation of natural gas prices and the47
required unbundling of sale and transportation services.  These regulatory changes are predicted ex
ante to increase the price risk exposures of pipeline firms before consideration of the firms'
responses to these changes.
Prior to the regulatory changes during the early part of our sample period, natural gas
pipeline companies used long-term contracts with both producers and customers to mitigate
exposure to natural gas prices.  As regulatory changes adversely affected pipelines, firms increased
diversification through acquisitions outside the natural gas industry and divestitures of subsidiaries
engaged in natural gas related business.  Firms also turned to exchange-traded derivative
instruments to manage exposures in the early 1990s when natural gas derivatives first became
available.  By the end of our sample period in 1995, all but two firms disclosed using derivatives
for risk management.
Derivatives are a substitute for holding large cash buffers and storing gas underground.
Univariate and factor analyses indicate that the latter two activities are complements.  Consistent
with this complementary relation, the financial characteristics of firms that hold high cash buffers
and store large quantities of gas ("hedgers") are similar to each other and are significantly different
from the characteristics of “non-hedgers” in these categories.  In addition, the users of financial
derivatives differ from the pipelines that use cash buffers and storage to hedge price risk.  The
derivative users have lower profit margins and are more financially distressed as evidenced by
worse S&P bond ratings, lower dividend yields, and higher market-to-book ratios.  Finally,
accounting earnings management strategies are not complements to activities that have a “real”
effect on cash flow volatility and diversification is not related to financial hedging activities.
Over the entire period from 1978 to 1995, the pipeline firms are generally sensitive to
wellhead gas prices but the exposures change through time.  Risk-adjusted market-based estimates
of wellhead gas price sensitivities are negative in the first several years of the sample and become
significantly positive following price deregulation, especially after the Decontrol Act of 1989.  The
change in sign of the natural gas price sensitivities is consistent with the changing nature of the
natural gas firm during this period of deregulation from that of a consumer of natural gas to that of
producer and transporter of natural gas.48
Cross-sectional variation in price sensitivities is related to firms’ use of combinations of
operational and financial activities.  Finally, firms that pursue operational and financial risk
management strategies have smaller and less variable risk-adjusted wellhead gas return exposures
than firms that do not.49
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Table I
Sample firms and their tenure in the sample from 1978 to 1995
List of publicly-traded natural gas firms that are major interstate natural gas pipelines or wholly or
partially own major interstate natural gas pipelines from 1978 to 1995.
FERC Form-2 Data
Availability
Major Interstate Pipelines wholly or partially
owned during the sample period









Burlington Northern 1978 1987 1 1 9,330 10,924
Burlington Resources 1988 1991 1 1 10,129 10,765
Central Louisiana Electric 1980 1980 1 1 392 392
Coastal 1978 1995 4 7 6,986 15,568
Columbia Gas Systems 1978 1990 1 3 9,946 11,288
Commonwealth Energy Systems 1978 1985 1 1 314 324
Consolidated Natural Gas 1978 1995 1 1 3,515 4,678
Consumers Power/CMS Energy 1978 1995 1 1 543 570
CSX 1983 1987 1 2 5,574 5,787
Eastern Enterprises 1978 1985 1 1 335 345
El Paso Natural Gas 1992 1995 2 2 5,303 10,540
Enron 1978 1995 1 6 9,386 33,064
Equitable Resources 1989 1995 1 1 478 530
Florida Gas 1978 1979 1 1 4,279 4,286
Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric 1990 1992 1 1 NA NA
K N Energy 1978 1995 1 2 6,053 18,332
LaSalle Energy 1988 1989 6 7 15,261 15,441
Leviathan Gas 1991 1995 1 3 138 239
MDU Resources 1985 1995 1 1 3,071 3,224
Midamerican Energy Company 1995 1995 1 1 NA NA
MidCon 1980 1985 2 7 10,232 13,220
National Fuel Gas 1978 1995 1 2 1,369 3,256
Noram Energy 1982 1995 1 2 1,964 8,644
Northern States Power 1993 1995 1 1 549 549
Northwest Energy 1979 1982 2 4 433 5,835
Occidental Petroleum 1986 1995 1 9 10,403 15,162
Pacific Gas & Electric 1978 1995 1 1 637 1,336
Panenergy 1978 1995 3 6 10,646 21,982
Primark 1982 1988 1 1 2,186 2,295
Questar 1984 1995 1 3 1,517 2,204
Sonat 1978 1995 2 3 7,048 10,575
Tenneco 1978 1995 2 5 14,246 17,181
Texaco 1978 1980 1 1 174 174
Texas Eastern 1978 1989 1 3 3,746 14,360
Texas Gas Transmission 1978 1982 1 1 5,575 5,672
Transcanada Pipelines 1978 1995 1 2 247 1,287
Transco Energy 1978 1994 1 6 9,051 16,499
United Energy Resources 1978 1985 2 6 7,473 7,726
Williams Company 1983 1995 3 5 103 6,21553
Table II
Summary of sensitivities of revenues and income to natural gas wellhead prices
Regression estimates of the sensitivity of annual changes in eight earnings metrics to changes in annual average
natural gas wellhead prices.  Regressions are estimated for firms with at least seven observations.   The earnings
metrics are total firm revenues, operating income, and net income; total natural gas transmission and distribution
revenues, segment revenues, and operating income reported on Compustat; and gas transmission and distribution
revenues, operating income, and net income reported FERC Form 2 filings.  # significant denotes numbers of
estimates that are significant at the 10% (or better) significance level.






Total firm revenue Mean 0.0274 0.5893
(N = 25) Std Dev 0.0876 0.4574
Minimum -0.2245 -0.4579 -18.14
Maximum 0.2084 1.936 70.04
# significant 8 14
Segment revenue Mean 56.2104 -52.3693
(N = 21) Std Dev 200.6785 472.8736
Minimum -13.6243 -1,760.84 -14.29
Maximum 927.3887 1,157.84 55.76
# significant 12 4
FERC 2  segment Mean 1.1927 2.5353
revenue Std Dev 3.5533 11.620
(N = 22) Minimum -0.2300 -19.2830 -10.95
Maximum 12.1680 48.0216 89.51
# significant 4 11
Total firm operating Mean 0.0667 0.3738
income Std Dev 0.1240 0.6727
(N = 25) Minimum -0.2358 -1.7119 -11.58
Maximum 0.2957 1.7760 78.91
# significant 5 7
Segment operating Mean 4.4044 -17.2427
income Std Dev 13.5213 68.5259
(N = 21) Minimum -22.9176 -261.3736 -14.08
Maximum 49.2350 71.4033 91.75
# significant 8 9
FERC 2 Mean 1.3183 0.0997
segment Std Dev 4.0094 4.0592
operating Minimum -0.5836 -11.1407 -13.79
income Maximum 18.4626 13.9614 72.78
(N = 22) # significant 1 2
Total firm Mean 0.2115 6.6569
net income Std Dev 12.5307 22.4894
(N = 25) Minimum -8.7335 -45.1990 -19.34
Maximum 60.7187 77.8693 51.39
# significant 7 8
FERC segment Mean -0.8142 1.1986
net income Std Dev 4.0938 13.976
(N=22) Minimum -15.5021 -34.6849 -13.99
Maximum 7.2297 45.5191 26.22
# significant 0 154
Table III
Average selected gas account statistics for 1979, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1992, and 1995
Average selected gas account statistics for fiscal year-end 1979, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1992, and 1995.  t-statistics for
tests of the difference between the annual mean and 1979 are reported in parentheses.
1979 1984 1987 1990
a 1992 1995
Panel A:  Sample
Number of firms 22 24 22 21 21 21
Number of pipelines 33 58 57 53 52 54
Total pipeline miles 147,630 157,137 165,061 158,124 142,867 137,592
Panel B: Natural gas wellhead prices (dollars/mcf)
Average annual price 0.91 2.66 1.67 1.71 1.74 1.55
Year-end price 0.91 2.57 1.70 2.04 2.21 1.84
Panel C: Selected gas account data for FERC 2 pipelines
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a1990 numbers are calculated excluding firm observations for which gas receipts and total gas sales and deliveries are
negative.
bA negative number denotes a credit downgrade.56
Table IV
Summary of statistics for natural gas wellhead price betas and stock market betas
Regression estimates for an extended market model regression of equal-weighted portfolios of
natural gas company returns on equal-weighted market return (RM) in excess of the Treasury Bill
3-month rate (RTB) and the excess return of average wellhead prices (RNG – RTB).  Market and
Treasury Bill returns are from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and wellhead
returns are calculated using monthly wellhead prices.
+ - + - + = - ) ( ) ( TB NG NG TB M M TB P R R R R R R
bNG bM
Mean -0.05 0.65
Standard deviation 0.16 0.08
Hansen-Hodrick t-statistic -3.85 36.31
Minimum -0.35 0.42
Maximum 0.21 0.88
% significant at the 10% level 21% 83%
Regression estimates for an extended Fama-French (1993) five-factor model of  equal-weighted
portfolios of natural gas company returns on the value-weighted market return (RM) in excess of
the Treasury Bill 3-month rate (RTB), the excess return of average wellhead prices (RNG – RTB),
the return on  a  size factor-mimicking  portfolio (RSMB),  the  return  on  a  value  effect  factor-
mimicking portfolio (RHML), the return on a portfolio capturing the slope of the term structure of
interest rates (RTERM), and the return on a portfolio that is long low-grade corporate bonds and
short high-grade corporate bonds (RDEF).  Wellhead returns are calculated using monthly wellhead
prices.
RP R TB M(RM R TB) NG(RNG RTB)
                      HMLRHML SMBRSMB TERMRTERM DEFRDEF
bNG bM
Mean -0.02 1.02
Standard deviation 0.15 0.14
Hansen-Hodrick t-statistic -1.82 18.03
Minimum -0.44 0.71
Maximum 0.19 1.43
% significant at the 10% level 18% 92%57
Table V
Descriptive statistics of proxies for hedging activities for selected years
Descriptive statistics for hedging activity variables for fiscal year-ends 1979, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1992, and 1995.
Means are presented in the first row.  Standard deviations {in curly brackets} and medians [in square brackets] are
presented for some continuous variables.  Concentration (CONC) is the measure of segment focus from Comment
and Jarrell (1995) such that larger amounts represent greater focus (less diversification).  Acquisitions and divestitures
are segregated for natural gas (NG) and entities not related to natural gas (non-NG).  Special items - other consists
primarily of litigation reserves, reserves for environmental remediation costs, gains and losses on sales of assets
including investment securities, PPE, and subsidiaries, and miscellaneous amounts.  O&G reserves represent
provisions for losses on oil and gas inventories or oil and gas-related properties that are created because of permanent
impairments in value or inventory accounting ceiling tests.
1979 1984 1987 1990 1992 1995
Derivative    % using commodity - - - 0.190 0.300 0.850
Instruments:    % using interest rate - - - 0.190 0.300 0.750
   % using currency - - - 0.238 0.300 0.350
Contracting: Take-or-pay costs/Sales 0.008 0.017 0.037 0.015 - -
{0.010} {0.017} {0.035} {0.018}
[0.002] [0.020] [0.029] [0.005] - -
Operating Gas in storage/Total gas 0.143 0.167 0.220 0.195 0.162 0.173
activities: {0.166} {0.170} {0.248} {0.289} {0.263} {0.275}
[0.066] [0.091] [0.103] [0.075] [0.069] [0.071]
Focus: No. of segments (0-9) 2.524 2.917 3.136 2.571 2.500 2.905
[3.000] [3.000] [3.000] [3.000] [2.000] [3.000]
Concentration (CONC) 0.722 0.708 0.698 0.694 0.665 0.598
{0.228} {0.226} {0.226} {0.199} {0.216} {0.206}
[0.706] [0.719] [0.737] [0.618] [0.585] [0.522]
Acquisitions/ Number of net pipeline 0.091 0.217 0.045 (0.100) 0.050 0.050
Divestitures    acquisitions/(sales) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Percentage change in 12.28% 1.08% -1.41% 5.73% 7.56% 0.81%
   owned pipeline miles [0.21%] [0.33%] [0.00%] [1.15%] [0.95%] [0.00%]
No. of acquisitions-NG 1 5 10 11 12 8
   Mean deal value/Sales 0.001 0.013 0.018 0.032 0.007 0.017
No. of non-NG acquis. 1 6 12 9 5 14
   Mean deal value/Sales 0.004 0.009 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.012
No. of divestitures-NG 0 2 4 6 13 5
   Mean deal value/Sales 0.000 0.017 0.003 0.004 0.028 0.003
No. of non-NG divests. 0 5 19 6 9 10
   Mean deal value/Sales 0.000 0.006 0.026 0.004 0.001 0.013
Cash Cash/(Total assets-cash)
Buffers:      Gas subsidiary only 0.024 0.033 0.041 0.011 0.033 0.024
{0.023} {0.040} {0.080} {0.019} {0.061} {0.058}
[0.017] [0.021] [0.006] [0.007] [0.005] [0.003]
     Parent company 0.028 0.035 0.027 0.018 0.020 0.015
{0.032} {0.038} {0.034} {0.029} {0.022} {0.011}
[0.012] [0.020] [0.011] [0.009] [0.011] [0.009]58
Table V, continued
Earnings Restructuring charges/ 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001
Mgmt: Sales {0.000} {0.000} {0.008} {0.022} {0.016} {0.003}
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
O&G reserves/Sales 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 0.000 -0.0001
{0.000} {0.007} {0.006} {0.023} {0.000} {0.000}
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
|Other special items|/ 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.015 0.014
   Sales {0.000} {0.007} {0.007} {0.011} {0.038} {0.028}
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002]
% using SE 0.222 0.095 0.444 0.375 0.500 0.50059
Table VI
Comparison of hedging activities across categories of hedgers
Univariate comparisons of hedging activities by the sample firms categorized as hedgers (H) and non-hedgers (NH)
based on various definitions of hedging activities.  For activities measured using dichotomous variables, the table
indicates which group is defined as hedgers.  For activities measured using continuous variables, firms are ranked
into triciles based on the level of the activity and designated as high (HI) or low (LOW) if the firm is in the upper or
lower tricile, respectively.  The table indicates whether the HI-firms or LOW-firms are hedgers.  For each activity,
means of the proxies for the other hedging activities are presented.  The data are pooled across all years.  Derivatives
data are available only for 1990 through 1995.  The second column indicates the prediction about whether a firm that
hedges (H) using the strategy indicated by the proxy variable in that row will have a higher or lower mean value of
that proxy variable than a non-hedger (NH).
Hedgers Non-hedgers t-value
Hedging activity:  Financial derivatives DERIV = 1 DERIV = 0
Take-or-pay costs/Sales H>NH 0.010 0.012 0.28
Gas in storage/Gas sales and deliveries (bcfs) H>NH 0.118 0.252 2.19**
No. of segments (0-9) H>NH 2.683 2.667 -0.08
Concentration H<NH 0.659 0.653 -0.16
Percentage change in pipeline miles ? 0.016 0.041 0.49
Restructuring charges/Sales NA -0.002 -0.002 -0.03
O&G valuation reserves/Sales NA -0.00004 -0.002 -0.98
|Other special items|/Sales NA 0.008 0.007 -0.25
% using successful efforts H<NH 0.552 0.458 -0.79
Cash/(Total assets-cash) - Parent company H>NH 0.015 0.016 0.47
Gas subsidiary H>NH 0.007 0.022 1.93*
Hedging activity:  Operating activities - storage HI STORAGE LOW STORAGE
% using commodity derivatives H>NH 0.433 0.800 2.98***
Take-or-pay costs/Sales H>NH 0.023 0.024 0.27
No. of segments (0-9) H>NH 2.562 3.314 4.60***
Concentration H<NH 0.764 0.610 -4.94***
Percentage change in pipeline miles ? 0.029 0.043 2.03**
Restructuring charges/Sales NA 0.000 -0.002 -1.61
O&G valuation reserves/Sales NA 0.000 -0.003 -2.03**
|Other special items|/Sales NA 0.004 0.006 0.61
% using successful efforts H<NH 0.232 0.358 1.77
Cash/(Total assets-cash) - Parent company H>NH 0.018 0.018 -0.01
Gas subsidiary H>NH 0.033 0.016 -1.94*
Hedging activity: Focus - Concentration (CONC) LOW CONC HI CONC
% using commodity derivatives H>NH 0.405 0.485 0.69
Take-or-pay costs/Sales H>NH 0.026 0.032 0.62
Gas in storage/Gas sales and deliveries (bcfs) H>NH 0.238 0.218 -0.53
No. of segments (0-9) H>NH 3.511 1.641 -16.44***
Percentage change in pipeline miles ? 0.031 0.022 -0.24
Restructuring charges/Sales NA -0.001 -0.0001 1.43
O&G valuation reserves/Sales NA -0.001 -0.001 0.14
|Other special items|/Sales NA 0.007 0.010 0.66
% using successful efforts H<NH 0.364 0.188 -2.87***
Cash/(Total assets-cash) - Parent company H>NH 0.020 0.025 1.38
Gas subsidiary H>NH 0.043 0.026 -1.65*60
Table VI, continued
H v. NH Hedgers Non-hedgers t-value
Hedging activity:  Focus - No. of segments (NSEG) HI NSEG LOW NSEG
% using commodity derivatives H>NH 0.493 0.455 -0.31
Take-or-pay costs/Sales H>NH 0.020 0.036 1.13
Gas in storage/Gas sales and deliveries (bcfs) H>NH 0.187 0.196 0.35
Concentration H<NH 0.591 0.955 20.99***
Percentage change in pipeline miles ? 0.036 0.021 -0.48
Restructuring charges/Sales NA -0.001 0.000 2.04**
O&G valuation reserves/Sales NA -0.002 -0.001 0.99
|Other special items|/Sales NA 0.006 0.012 0.57
% using successful efforts H<NH 0.299 0.172 -2.13**
Cash/(Total assets-cash) - Parent company H>NH 0.021 0.029 1.67*
Gas subsidiary H>NH 0.030 0.042 1.12
Hedging activity: Pipeline acquisitions HI CHMILES LOW CHMILES
% using commodity derivatives H>NH 0.486 0.529 0.36
Take-or-pay costs/Sales H>NH 0.023 0.026 0.30
Gas in storage/Gas sales and deliveries (bcfs) H>NH 0.155 0.202 1.40
No. of segments (0-9) H>NH 2.675 2.765 0.58
Concentration H<NH 0.722 0.681 -1.33
Restructuring charges/Sales NA -0.0009 -0.0002 1.43
O&G valuation reserves/Sales NA -0.006 -0.0003 2.15**
|Other special items|/Sales NA 0.006 0.010 0.79
% using successful efforts H<NH 0.287 0.405 1.65*
Cash/(Total assets-cash) - Parent company H>NH 0.024 0.021 -0.54
- Gas subsidiary H>NH 0.031 0.020 -1.15
Hedging activity:  Earnings management - FC v. SE FC SE
% using commodity derivatives H>NH 0.333 0.421 -0.79
Take-or-pay costs/Sales H>NH 0.022 0.024 -0.43
Gas in storage/Gas sales and deliveries (bcfs) H>NH 0.216 0.167 1.64
No. of segments (0-9) H>NH 2.892 2.926 -0.27
Concentration H<NH 0.704 0.621 3.28***
Percentage change in pipeline miles ? 0.033 0.009 0.76
Restructuring charges/Sales NA -0.0002 -0.002 1.35
O&G valuation reserves/Sales NA -0.002 -0.002 -0.29
|Other special items|/Sales NA 0.004 0.011 -2.64***
Cash/(Total assets-cash) - Parent company H>NH 0.023 0.018 1.60
- Gas subsidiary H>NH 0.033 0.033 -0.06
Hedging activity:  Gas subsidiary cash buffers HI CASH LOW CASH
% using commodity derivatives H>NH 0.291 0.522 1.62
Take-or-pay costs/Sales H>NH 0.013 0.025 1.94*
Gas in storage/Gas sales and deliveries (bcfs) H>NH 0.235 0.082 -3.10***
No. of segments (0-9) H>NH 2.871 3.211 1.83*
Concentration H<NH 0.650 0.696 1.34
Percentage change in pipeline miles ? 0.009 0.020 0.41
Restructuring charges/Sales NA -0.0002 -0.0006 -1.21
O&G valuation reserves/Sales NA -0.001 -0.002 -0.03
|Other special items|/Sales NA 0.006 0.003 -1.01
% using successful efforts H<NH 0.242 0.250 0.10
Cash/(Total assets-cash) - Parent company H>NH 0.038 0.012 -6.68***61
Table VI, continued
H v. NH Hedgers Non-hedgers t-value
Hedging activity:  Regulatory rate adjustments SFAS 71 - Yes SFAS 71 - No
% using commodity derivatives H>NH 0.462 0.695 2.35**
Take-or-pay costs/Sales H>NH 0.032 0.021 -0.77
Gas in storage/Gas sales and deliveries (bcfs) H>NH 0.352 0.097 -4.58***
No. of segments (0-9) H>NH 2.372 2.861 2.72***
Concentration H<NH 0.735 0.653 -2.42**
Percentage change in pipeline miles ? 0.034 0.006 -1.05
Restructuring charges/Sales NA -0.0002 -0.002 -2.17**
O&G valuation reserves/Sales NA -0.002 -0.005 -1.23
|Other special items|/Sales NA 0.008 0.006 -0.63
% using successful efforts H<NH 0.217 0.511 3.76***
Cash/(Total assets-cash) - Parent company H>NH 0.017 0.027 2.82***62
Table VII
Summary of Factor Analysis
Summary of explanatory power and rotated factor pattern for six factors related to hedging activities.  The first row of
the table specifies the names of the hypothetical factors which are based on the variables that load on the factor.  For
each factor, the eignenvalue and percentage of variation explained by the factor are presented.  The factor pattern
presented is the pattern after oblique rotation.  These tabulated rotated factor loadings are converted to standardized
scores and multiplied by the standardized variables to create definitions of hedgers and non-hedgers.  Loadings
designated in bold are for the variables with significant loadings on the factor in that column.  Factors are estimated
using data from 1990-1995.  Factor loadings estimated for the earlier sample period (that exclude derivatives use



















Measures of explained variance:
Eigenvalue 2.55129 1.72887 1.44116 1.25240 1.16073 1.00630
% of variation explained by
     the factor 19.63% 13.30% 11.09% 9.63% 8.93% 7.74%
Cumulative 19.63% 32.92% 44.01% 53.64% 62.57% 70.31%
Rotated factor pattern:
Cash/(Total assets-cash)
     Parent company 0.79846 -0.13318 0.09751 -0.08096 -0.23014 0.24990
STORAGE (in bcfs) 0.75634 -0.41757 -0.14903 -0.08564 -0.10128 0.05296
Concentration (CONC) -0.73832 -0.25611 0.04219 0.00183 -0.26977 0.29459
% using commodity
derivs.
-0.10932 0.75060 0.13587 -0.02367 -0.10038 0.17962
% using other derivatives -0.06969 0.79627 0.12184 -0.00925 0.08906 0.08052
Number of NG divestitures -0.10735 0.10675 0.72850 0.10350 0.24987 0.41563
No. of non-NG divestitures 0.05353 0.21837 0.73276 0.10485 -0.23013 0.05501
Restructuring charges 0.03425 -0.01885 -0.69838 0.13697 -0.18970 0.25841
Provisions for O&G losses 0.14534 0.35691 -0.18174 -0.68755 0.08853 -0.15787
% change in pipeline
miles
-0.04404 0.10219 -0.08996 0.77311 0.37375 0.08323
Number of NG acquisitions -0.06502 0.01113 0.09144 0.04809 0.86097 0.07450
No. of non-NG acquisitions 0.07347 0.27936 -0.00824 0.03984 0.08675 0.80631
Special items - other 0.01582 0.14606 -0.02487 0.50553 -0.31904 -0.2953363
Table VIII
Comparison of selected firm characteristics by categories of hedgers
Univariate comparisons of selected firm characteristics by their hedging activities.  Firms are categorized as hedgers
(H) and non-hedgers (NH) based on each activity.  The averages of the annual means are reported for each category of
firms in columns two and three.  The last column reports the number of years for which the difference in the means
of each groups are different from zero at the 10% significance level or better.  Derivatives data are available only for
1990 through 1995.
Mean of annual means





Use of derivatives DERIV = 1 DERIV = 0 t-statistic 90 – 95
Operating Income/Sales 0.179 0.268 3.66*** 3
Net Income/Sales 0.045 0.064 -0.35 0
Interest Coverage Ratio 2.949 4.109 1.44 3
Firm Size ($ Millions) 6,381 6,831 -0.27 0
Long-term debt ratio 0.482 0.445 0.01 1
S&P bond rating 8.779 7.430 -2.62** 1
Dividend Yield 0.044 0.050 2.34** 1
Market-Book Ratio 4.127 3.176 -2.61** 2
Operating activities - storage HI STORAGE LOW STORAGE t-statistic 78 – 95
Operating Income/Sales 0.189 0.174 -1.38 3
Net Income/Sales 0.058 0.053 -0.78 1
Interest Coverage Ratio 4.267 3.682 -2.58** 1
Firm Size ($ Millions) 2,220 5,779 7.33*** 0
Long-term debt ratio 0.456 0.477 1.32 2
S&P Bond rating 6.613 9.140 5.78*** 2
Dividend Yield 0.064 0.041 -5.05*** 4
Market-Book Ratio 2.522 3.096 3.45*** 2
Operating activities - Diversification LOW CONC HI CONC t-statistic 78 – 95
Operating Income/Sales 0.195 0.181 -1.36 4
Net Income/Sales 0.054 0.071 0.91 4
Interest Coverage Ratio 3.664 4.204 1.71* 0
Firm Size ($ Millions) 5,329 2,924 -5.61*** 5
Long-term debt ratio 0.489 0.472 -1.04 4
S&P Bond rating 8.344 7.587 -1.68* 1
Dividend Yield 0.057 0.061 0.82 1
Market-Book Ratio 2.893 2.809 -0.45 1
Operating activities - Diversification HI SEG LOW SEG t-statistic 78 – 95
Operating Income/Sales 0.188 0.204 1.04 1
Net Income/Sales 0.048 0.090 1.72* 3
Interest Coverage Ratio 3.861 4.329 1.03 0
Firm Size ($ Millions) 4,332 4,097 0.04 0
Long-term debt ratio 0.474 0.478 0.08 3
S&P Bond rating 8.594 7.173 -2.72*** 2
Dividend Yield 0.051 0.064 3.24*** 2
Market-Book Ratio 2.867 2.843 -0.01 164
Table VIII, continued
Mean of annual means
Strategies and firm characteristics: Hedgers Non-Hedgers
Test for difference
in means
# sig in annual
tests
Pipeline mile acquisitions HI CHMILES LOW CHMILES t-statistic 78 – 95
Operating Income/Sales 0.198 0.181 -1.21 0
Net Income/Sales 0.064 0.051 -0.75 0
Interest Coverage Ratio 3.922 3.848 -0.31 0
Firm Size ($ Millions) 4,605 4,466 -0.12 0
Long-term debt ratio 0.452 0.471 0.95 1
S&P Bond rating 7.982 7.964 0.26 0
Dividend Yield 0.052 0.055 1.19 4
Market-Book Ratio 2.912 2.740 -1.21 4
Gas subsidiary Cash Holdings HI CASH LOW CASH t-statistic 78 – 95
Operating Income/Sales 0.222 0.175 -2.95*** 2
Net Income/Sales 0.090 0.044 -1.85* 2
Interest Coverage Ratio 4.313 3.296 -2.54** 3
Firm Size ($ Millions) 3,481 4,813 1.97* 0
Long-term debt ratio 0.464 0.522 3.16*** 5
S&P Bond rating 7.823 9.256 3.36*** 1
Dividend Yield 0.052 0.045 -1.23 1
Market-Book Ratio 2.889 3.127 1.54 1
Earnings management - FC v. SE FC SE t-statistic 78 – 95
Operating Income/Sales 0.204 0.188 -2.39*** 1
Net Income/Sales 0.075 0.045 -1.67* 2
Interest Coverage Ratio 3.884 3.901 0.90 0
Firm Size ($ Millions) 6,849 3,378 -5.72*** 0
Long-term debt ratio 0.449 0.478 2.00** 2
S&P Bond rating 7.623 7.867 0.59 0
Dividend Yield 0.060 0.052 -0.55 0
Market-Book Ratio 2.671 2.975 0.22 1
Regulatory accounting  SFAS71 –Yes SFAS71 - No t-statistic
Operating Income/Sales 0.226 0.188 -3.30*** 2
Net Income/Sales 0.075 0.459 -2.00** 3
Interest Coverage Ratio 4.231 3.643 -2.69*** 2
Firm Size ($ Millions) 3,891 5,245 2.64*** 0
Long-term debt ratio 0.434 0.461 1.82* 2
S&P Bond rating 6.530 8.672 -5.40*** 4
Dividend Yield 0.050 0.051 -2.57** 3
Market-Book Ratio 2.839 3.056 2.29** 465
Table IX
Cross-sectional variation in natural gas wellhead betas as a function of risk-
related activities
Summary of regressions of natural gas wellhead betas derived from the two-factor model described in table IV on an
intercept and proxies for risk-related activities.  The regressions are estimated yearly; the means of the annual
intercepts and the annual coefficients on the risk proxies are presented.  t-statistics and Z-statistics are presented in
parentheses below the estimates.  The Z-statistic is calculated as Z = t / s t ( )/ N-1 ( ) [ ] where t  and s t ( )  are the
average and standard deviation of the annual t-statistics, respectively, and N is the number of annual observations.
a
The last column reports the number of annual estimations for which the hedger coefficient is statistically significant
at better than the 15% significance level (# sig years).
Dependent variable: bNG Dependent variable:  |bNG|
Risk-related activity:









b -0.067 1 0.009 0
(-0.79) {-0.68} (0.28) {0.42}
Successful efforts = 1, full cost = 0 0.293 3 0.085 2
(2.37) {1.81} (0.66) {0.67}
Take-or-pay costs/Sales 2.845 0 -1.156 4
(0.86)  {0.76} (-1.76) {-0.95}
Percentage change in owned pipeline miles -0.421 2 -0.338 2
(-0.50)  {-0.97} (-0.52) {-0.90}
Cash/(Total assets-cash) 0.380 2 -1.577 1
(0.23)  {-0.13} (-2.07) {-1.49}
Concentration (CONC) -0.116 1 0.313 2
(-0.62) {-0.75} (2.07) {2.57}
Gas in storage/gas sales & deliveries (bcfs) 0.540 2 -0.030 1
(3.31) {2.66} (-0.18) {-0.01}
Factor 1: Operating activities factor 0.028 1 -0.040 1
(0.60) {0.41} (-2.33) {-2.12}
Factor 2: Financial hedging factor -0.021 0 0.021 0
(-0.76) {-0.62} (1.44) {1.55}
Factor 3: Restructuring factor -0.017 0 -0.004 0
(-0.93) {-0.49} (-0.14) {0.86}
Factor 4: Gas factor -0.129 1 -0.172 1
(-1.28) {-0.56} (-1.39) {-0.30}
Factor 5: NG acquisition factor -0.016 1 -0.015 0
(-1.39) {-1.20} (-0.74) {-1.22}
Factor 6: Non-NG acquisition factor 0.079 1 -0.012 0
(1.44) {0.69} (-1.14) {-1.38}
a An alternative test statistic is Z' =1 T ti t=1
N
å ki (k i -2)  where ti is the t-statistic for year i and ki is the
degrees of freedom.  Z' assumes the annual parameter estimates are independent and is likely overstated; Z corrects for
the potential lack of independence.  (See Healy, Kang and Palepu, 1987.)
b This sample is based on six annual coefficient estimates from 1990-1995 (when derivatives data are available).66
Table X
Summary of natural gas wellhead return betas and stock market betas across for
hedgers and non-hedgers
Regression estimates for an extended market model regression of equal-weighted portfolios of the returns of natural
gas company defined as financial or operational hedgers on equal-weighted market return (RM) in excess of the
Treasury Bill 3-month rate (RTB) and the excess return of average wellhead prices (RNG – RTB).  Market and
Treasury bill returns are from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and wellhead returns are calculated
using monthly wellhead prices.  A firm is defined as an operational hedger if it uses two or more possible
operational hedging methods.  Firms thus identified are assigned to the hedger portfolio monthly; the 48-month
window precedes this point.  A firm is defined to be a financial hedger if it used commodity derivatives in the year
preceding portfolio assignation.  The two-factor model is described in Table IV.  Derivatives data are available only
for 1990 through 1995.  Descriptive statistics are presented for bNG which is the sensitivity of the natural gas
portfolio returns to the wellhead return factor, and bM which is the market beta.
Panel A:  Hedging defined based on the use of commodity derivatives
Hedgers Non-hedgers
bNG bM bNG bM
Mean -0.005 0.29 0.02 0.33
Standard deviation 0.020 0.36 0.03 0.28
Hansen-Hodrick t-statistic -2.860 9.57 10.21 7.62
Minimum -0.050 0.14 -0.04 0.13
Maximum 0.050 1.08 0.80 1.64
% significant at the 10% level 2.7% 71% 12.8% 67%
Panel B:  Hedging defined based on the use of non-derivative strategies
Hedgers Non-hedgers
bNG bM bNG bM
Mean -0.0049 0.57 0.13 1.02
Standard deviation 0.080 0.23 0.14 0.24
Hansen-Hodrick t-statistic -1.370 12.29 18.90 10.49
Minimum -0.040 0.12 -0.38 0.68
Maximum 0.091 0.84 0.40 1.59
% significant at the 10% level 4.8% 84% 10.9% 88%
Panel C: Hedging defined based on the factor classifications
Hedgers Non-hedgers
bNG bM bNG bM
Mean -0.018 0.37 0.11 0.66
Standard deviation 0.028 0.27 0.12 0.42
Hansen-Hodrick t-statistic -0.300 8.25 5.76 8.57
Minimum -0.070 0.17 -0.32 -0.13
Maximum 0.089 1.48 0.44 1.81
% significant at the 10% level 1.7% 76% 12.3% 84%Figure 1: Monthly wellhead prices and significant regulatory events





















































































































Apr 1992 Order 436
Oct. 1985
Order 500
Oct. 1987Figure2a:  Full-Sample Wellhead Return Betas

















































































































































































DateFigure3a:  Full-Sample Wellhead Return Betas



















































































































































































DateFigure4b:  T-Statistics for Natural Gas Betas 2-Factor Market 









Figure4a:  Non-derivative Hedger Wellhead Return Betas



































































aFigure5a:  Full-Sample Wellhead Return Betas



























































































































































Figure 5b: T-statistics for Natural Gas Betas
2-Factor Model, 48-Month Window: Factor Hedgers
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